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Abstract
The euro crisis was fueled by the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank
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supply of euro safe assets when protected by a 30%-thick junior tranche. Second,
a model shows how, when and why the two features of ESBies—diversification and
seniority—can weaken the diabolic loop and its diffusion across countries. Third,
we propose a step-by-step guide on how to create ESBies, starting with limited
issuance by public or private-sector entities.
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1 Introduction
The creation of the euro in 1999 was a landmark in the European integration process.
Since 2009, however, the euro area has been roiled by financial crisis, with heightened
sovereign default risk, a weakened banking sector, and a stagnating macroeconomy.
Why did this happen? Among many factors, the euro area lacked institutional features
necessary for the success of a monetary union, including emergency funding for sovereigns
and common banking supervision and resolution (Brunnermeier, James & Landau, 2016).
While some of these deficiencies have since been addressed, one crucial feature remains
missing. The euro area as a whole does not have a safe asset: one that guarantees a pay-
off at virtually any point in time and state of the world, including crises (see Section 2).
By storing value in safe assets, rather than the risky sovereign bonds of the nation-state
in which they reside, banks can avoid the diabolic loop between their own solvency and
that of their sovereign. Moreover, in a cross-border currency area, union-wide safe assets
ensure that flight-to-safety capital flows occur across assets (i.e. from risky to risk-free
assets) rather than countries, thereby avoiding fire sales of sovereign bonds.
To fill this gap, Brunnermeier, Garicano, Lane, Pagano, Reis, Santos, Thesmar,
Van Nieuwerburgh & Vayanos (2011) propose “European Safe Bonds”,1 formed from
the senior tranche of a diversified portfolio of euro area sovereign bonds (see Section 3).
ESBies entail no joint liability among sovereigns, in contrast to most other proposals.2
Sovereigns remain responsible for their own bonds, which would still be traded at a mar-
ket price, exerting discipline on borrowing decisions. One sovereign could default on its
own obligations without others bearing any bail-out responsibility and without holders
of ESBies bearing any losses. Also, in contrast with other proposals that require treaty
change, ESBies entail little downside political risk: if they ultimately failed to function,
society would not bear losses relative to the status quo.
1 European Safe Bonds are eponymous: they are “European” in that they are backed by the sovereign
bonds of all euro area members; they are “safe” as expected loss rates are minimal; and they are “bonds”
in that they are fixed-income instruments that investors may trade and hold.
2 Other proposals for union-wide safe assets engender some form of joint liability, rendering them
susceptible to political problems (since fiscal union requires political union to ensure democratic account-
ability) and incentive issues (since joint liability implies moral hazard), as documented by Claessens,
Mody & Valle´e (2012) and Tumpel-Gugerell (2014). Common issuance of eurobonds, contemplated
by the European Commission (2011) and Ubide (2015), implies joint liability. The blue-red proposal of
Von Weizsacker & Delpla (2010) entails joint liability for the first 60% of a sovereign’s debt stock (relative
to GDP). The “eurobills” proposal of Philippon & Hellwig (2011) involves joint issuance of short-maturity
bills of up to 10% of a country’s GDP. Even the German Council of Economic Experts’ (2012) proposal
for a “European Redemption Pact” involves some degree of joint liability, albeit with strict conditionality,
and without leading to the creation of a union-wide safe asset. Hild, Herz & Bauer (2014) envisage a
security similar to ESBies, namely a synthetic security backed by a GDP-weighted portfolio of sovereign
bonds, but with partial joint liability among nation-states. To our knowledge, the only proposal for a
pooled security that does not engender joint liability is that of Beck, Wagner & Uhlig (2011), whose
“synthetic eurobond” is comparable to ESBies without tranching. Our simulations in Section 4 and our
model in Section 5 show that tranching is critical to ESBies’ safety.
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We advocate Brunnermeier et al.’s proposal for a union-wide safe asset in three ways.
First, in Section 4, simulations gauge ESBies’ safety. With a subordination level of 30%,
ESBies have an expected loss rate slightly lower than German bunds. At the same time,
they would approximately double the supply of safe assets relative to the status quo. The
corresponding junior securities would be attractive investments, thanks to their embedded
leverage and expected loss rates similar to those of vulnerable euro area sovereign bonds.
These simulations take default probabilities as given. In fact, underlying default prob-
abilities can be expected to change endogenously in response to banks’ safer sovereign
bond portfolios. In Section 5, we extend a workhorse model of the diabolic loop between
sovereign risk and bank risk developed by Brunnermeier, Garicano, Lane, Pagano, Reis,
Santos, Thesmar, Van Nieuwerburgh & Vayanos (2016). We show that the diabolic loop
is less likely to arise if banks hold ESBies rather than domestic sovereign bonds or a
diversified portfolio with no tranching. ESBies are thus a “positive sum game”.
Third, in Sections 6 and 7, we propose a step-by-step guide on how to create ESBies.
At present, their creation is stymied by regulatory and market (coordination) failures.
To remove these roadblocks, policymakers should announce their intention to change the
prudential treatment of banks’ sovereign exposures, to be implemented once the market
for ESBies is up and running. They should also set common standards for the new
securities in an ESBies’ Handbook, including with respect to their subordination level and
underlying portfolio composition, and decide which institution(s) should be licensed to
issue ESBies. Following these steps, issuance should start with limited experimentation
before deepening the market with a centralized swap mechanism, such as an auction,
accompanied by strong signals from the European Central Bank regarding the treatment
and use of ESBies in its collateral framework and asset purchase program.
2 The crisis without a union-wide safe asset
Modern financial systems rely on safe assets. They lubricate financial transactions, which
often entail a contractual requirement to post as collateral some asset deemed as safe
(Giovannini, 2013). Safe assets allow market participants to transfer risks, like liquidity
or market risk, without creating new risks, like counterparty credit risk. To comply with
liquidity regulations, banks need to hold safe assets to meet their funding needs in a stress
scenario (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013). And central banks need safe
assets with which to conduct monetary policy, exchanging money, whether currency or
reserves, for quasi-money in the form of safe assets (Brunnermeier & Sannikov, 2016).
A safe asset is liquid, maintains value even in crises, and is denominated in a currency
with stable purchasing power. Relative to investors’ demand for safe assets, there is
scarce global supply of securities that possess all three characteristics of safety (Caballero,
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2010). The most widely held safe asset, US Treasury bills and bonds, earns a large “safe
haven” premium of 0.7% per year on average (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012).
Acute safe asset scarcity has negative macroeconomic effects by increasing risk premia and
pushing the economy into a “safety trap” (Caballero, Farhi & Gourinchas, 2016).
The euro area does not supply a safe asset on a par with US Treasuries, despite en-
compassing a similarly large economy and developed financial markets. Instead, euro area
nation-states issue bonds with heterogeneous risk and liquidity characteristics. Monetary
policy is conducted by an external authority (the European Central Bank), which is con-
strained in its ability to target credit and liquidity to specific member countries.3 Just
three euro area nation-states—Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg—are rated
triple-A. The face value of the general government gross debt of these nation-states stood
at e2.6tn in 2015, equal to 25% of euro area GDP. By contrast, the general govern-
ment gross debt of the United States, which is also rated triple-A, stood at $19tn (i.e.
e17.5tn) in 2015, equal to 105% of US GDP. The relative scarcity and asymmetric supply
of euro-denominated safe assets creates two problems, which we explain next.
2.1 Diabolic loop
Euro area banks hold e1.9tn of euro sovereign bonds, many of which are quite risky.
This is facilitated by regulation: in calculating capital requirements, bank regulators
assign a zero risk-weight to banks’ claims on EU members states, regardless of their fiscal
situation (see Subsection 6.1). Banks are therefore incentivized to hold sovereign bonds
to economize on capital, particularly during crises when capital is scarce and sovereign
risk and yields are elevated (European Systemic Risk Board, 2015).
Although the zero risk-weight applies to banks’ claims on any EU member state,
banks prefer to hold claims on their own sovereign, particularly during crises (Figure 1).4
Banks’ home bias in their sovereign bond portfolios creates a potent diabolic loop be-
tween sovereign risk and bank risk. The loop works as follows. Initially, sovereign risk
3 The Lisbon Treaty (Article 123) prohibits eurosystem central banks from extending credit facilities
to public authorities or directly purchasing debt instruments from them. This constraint has led Goodhart
(2013) to describe euro sovereign bonds as effectively “sub-sovereign”, since they are issued in a currency
over which the issuer has no control (de Grauwe, 2013).
4 Battistini, Pagano & Simonelli (2014) find that banks in vulnerable countries increased their do-
mestic sovereign debt holdings in response to increases in sovereign risk, reflecting distorted incentives.
Near-insolvent banks were attempting to earn “carry” on the interest rate spread in a gamble for res-
urrection (Acharya & Steffen, 2015; Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger & Hirsch, 2016; Buch, Koetter & Ohls,
2016). They were also responding to moral suasion by governments: domestic publicly-owned banks and
recently bailed-out banks reacted to sovereign stress by increasing their holdings of domestic public debt
significantly more than other banks (Becker & Ivashina, 2014; De Marco & Macchiavelli, 2016; Ongena,
Popov & Van Horen, 2016). Altavilla, Pagano & Simonelli (2016) find that the evidence is consistent
with both the “carry trade” and the “moral suasion” hypotheses, and that the increase in banks’ exposure
to domestic sovereign risk exacerbated their own solvency risk; consequently, these banks reduced their
lending volumes and increased their lending rates relative to other banks.
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increases owing to a shock, such as a productivity shock, asset price collapse, or a sunspot-
driven shift in investors’ expectations. The shock reduces the marked-to-market value of
sovereign bonds, causing banks’ book and market equity value to fall.
Figure 1: Mean of banks’ domestic sovereign bond holdings as a percentage of their total
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Note: Figure plots the mean of euro area banks’ holdings of their own sovereign’s debt as a proportion
of their total sovereign debt holdings. Banks are split into two subsamples: those resident in “non-
vulnerable” countries (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands) and those in “vulnerable” countries (i.e. Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus, Slovenia,
Greece). Source: ECB; Altavilla et al. (2016).
Two propagation channels follow. First, the increase in bank leverage raises the prob-
ability that the home sovereign will bail-out the bank’s bondholders, insofar as the bank
is deemed too important (or politically connected) to fail (Acharya, Drechsler & Schnabl,
2014). Second, in response to their increase in leverage, banks shed assets in an attempt
to return to their target leverage ratio (Adrian & Shin, 2014). This includes cuts in loans
to firms and households; the attendant credit crunch reduces economic activity (Altavilla
et al., 2016). These two channels—through government bail-outs and the real economy—
respectively increase the public debt stock and reduce tax revenue, exacerbating the initial
rise in sovereign risk and completing the diabolic loop (Figure 2).
This loop was the quintessential characteristic of the euro area sovereign debt crisis.
In some countries—particularly Ireland and Spain—widespread bank insolvencies endan-
gered the sustainability of sovereign debt dynamics. In other countries—Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Belgium—long run public debt accumulation and slow growth generated
sovereign debt dynamics that threatened banks’ solvency. In both cases, domestic gov-
ernments’ guarantees became less credible. As a result, the interaction of sovereign risk
and bank risk amplified the crisis after 2009. To weaken the diabolic loop, the euro area
needs a safe asset that banks can hold without being exposed to domestic sovereign risk.
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Figure 2: The sovereign-bank diabolic loop
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Note: Figure depicts the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk. The first loop operates
via a bail-out channel: the reduction in banks’ solvency raises the probability of a bail-out, increasing
sovereign risk and lowering bond prices. The second loop operates via the real economy: the reduction
in banks’ solvency owing to the fall in sovereign bond prices prompts them to cut lending—reducing real
activity, lowering tax revenues, and increasing sovereign risk further. Source: Brunnermeier et al. (2011).
2.2 Flight to safety
The asymmetric provision of safe assets creates distortions. In the euro area, this asym-
metry and the resulting distortions are particularly pronounced, since Germany supplies
83% of triple-A rated euro-denominated sovereign debt.
During the 2003-07 boom, capital flowed from non-vulnerable to vulnerable countries,
attracted by the perceived relative abundance of investment opportunities and the absence
of foreign exchange risk.5 This compressed sovereign bond spreads; investors effectively
treated all euro area nation-states’ bonds as safe. After 2009, investors began to question
the solvency of some euro area sovereigns and to perceive a risk that euro-denominated
securities in certain countries might be redenominated into a new currency at a deval-
ued exchange rate. Short-term capital flows from non-vulnerable to vulnerable countries
reversed, as investors sought safety above all else (Lane, 2013).
In the absence of a union-wide safe asset, non-vulnerable sovereigns’ debt partially
satisfied investors’ newfound demand for safety. The capital flow reversal depressed non-
vulnerable nation-states’ borrowing costs below the level justified by fundamentals—and,
in proportion, elevated vulnerable sovereigns’ borrowing costs. Hence, flight-to-safety
5 These boom-era capital flows fueled credit expansion in vulnerable countries, raising asset prices
and therefore attracting more flows, financing greater expansion. In the presence of financial frictions,
this credit expansion led to a slump in productivity and an appreciation of the real exchange rate because
it came with a misallocation of resources towards low productivity sectors (Reis, 2013), especially real
estate and other non-tradable sectors (Benigno & Fornaro, 2014).
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capital flowed from high-risk to low-risk countries. With ESBies, such cross-border flows
would not occur: in the event of a crisis, the flight to safety would instead take place from
high-risk to low-risk European assets.
With ESBies, the safe haven premium enjoyed during crises by the euro area’s pre-
eminent safe asset—German bunds—would dissipate. This dissipation is desirable: the
safe haven premium is the corollary of expectations-driven runs on sovereign debt else-
where in the euro area. From a German point of view, the loss of the safe haven premium
would be more than adequately compensated in two ways. First, the probability of crises
would diminish with ESBies, as we show in Section 5. Crises are strictly worse than good
states of the world, particularly for Germany’s export-oriented economy, and regardless
of the safe haven premium. Second, conditional on being in a crisis, bail-out requirements
would be smaller, as banks would be less exposed to sovereign risk.
3 Designing European Safe Bonds
ESBies are the senior tranche of a diversified portfolio of euro area sovereign bonds. Their
construction, as proposed by Brunnermeier et al. (2011), works as follows. A public or
private entity purchases a diversified portfolio of euro area sovereign bonds,6 weighted
according to a strict, well-defined rule, such as euro area countries’ relative GDPs or
contributions to ECB capital.7 To finance this purchase, the entity issues two types of
securities: European Safe Bonds (ESBies) and European Junior Bonds (EJBies).8 ESBies
are senior to EJBies. The tranching point at which the junior tranche is subordinated
to the senior tranche is set according to a pre-defined standard. Our base case is for the
subordination level to be set at 30%, such that the junior tranche represents 30%, and
the senior tranche 70%, of the underlying face value.
As a result of this construction, ESBies and EJBies would be fully collateralized by the
underlying portfolio, such that the combined face value of ESBies and EJBies equals the
sum of the face values of the national sovereign bonds against which ESBies and EJBies
are issued. The resulting balance sheet of the ESB-issuer is shown in Figure 3.9
6 We define sovereign bonds with reference to general government debt, which is the standard measure
of public debt used by the “Maastricht criteria” governing the European monetary union. However, the
portfolio could in principle comprise only a sub-category of public debt, such as central government debt.
7 For brevity, this paper considers only the securitization of euro area nation-states’ sovereign bonds.
However, the concept of ESBies could in principle be extended to other jurisdictional units, such as the
wider European Union. With broader coverage, ESB-issuers would need to manage exchange rate risk,
for example by increasing the subordination level or using foreign exchange derivatives.
8 In a variant of their core proposal, Brunnermeier et al. (2011) consider further protection for the
senior tranche in the form of a state-guaranteed “credit enhancement”. However, as we show in Section 4,
the credit enhancement is unnecessary to ensure the safety of the senior tranche. Thus ESBies need not
encompass any state guarantee; this is critical for their political feasibility.
9 Note that ESBies are fundamentally different from more opaque securitized assets such as mortgage-
backed securities (MBSs). They would be backed by standardised assets (sovereign bonds) that are traded
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Figure 3: Balance sheet of an ESB securitization vehicle
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Note: Figure shows the balance sheet of an ESB securitization vehicle, whereby its diversified portfolio
of sovereign bonds is financed by the issuance of two securities, with ESBies senior to EJBies.
Tranching is key to the safety of ESBies: losses arising from sovereign default would
first be borne by holders of the junior bond; only if they exceed the subordination level,
such that EJBies are entirely wiped out, would ESBies begin to take any losses. This
eventuality is highly unlikely, as we show numerically in Section 4.
ESBies couple the protection due to tranching with the benefit of diversification. With
these two features, ESBies meet the criteria of a union-wide safe asset defined in Section 2.
Insofar as banks hold ESBies as a safe store of value, the diabolic loop between sovereign
risk and bank risk would be weakened. The next sections explore the quantitative prop-
erties of ESBies, their effect on the diabolic loop, and their practical implementation.
4 Simulating the quantitative properties of ESBies
This section answers three related questions through a series of numerical simulations.
Would ESBies be as safe as the paragons of euro-denominated safe assets: the AAA-rated
sovereign bonds of Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg? Would their supply be
adequate for banks to use them as a safe store of value? And would there be enough
demand for EJBies?
The results lead us to answer “yes” to all three questions. First, with an appropriate
subordination level, ESBies can be designed such that they are at least as safe as German
sovereign bonds. Second, ESBies could more than double the supply of AAA-rated safe
assets relative to the status quo, without deviating from the fundamental principle that
they should be backed by the sovereign bonds of all euro area member states. Third,
on liquid secondary markets. By contrast, MBSs are backed by a multitude of heterogeneous mortgages
that have no liquid secondary market and for which prices are not directly observable. This makes
MBSs opaque and complex, allowing issuers to milk their reputation by engaging in lax screening (Keys,
Mukherjee, Seru & Vig, 2010), and credit rating agencies to assign noisy and biased ratings (Efing &
Hau, 2015). ESB-issuers would have no scope to engage in such reputation-milking.
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in our benchmark scenario, EJBies have an expected loss rate comparable to those of
vulnerable euro area sovereign bonds. We obtain these results by comparing four cases:
Status quo: In this case, each country issues its own sovereign bond; these bonds are
neither pooled across nation-states, nor tranched for safety.
National tranching: Each national sovereign bond is tranched into a senior and junior
component at a given subordination level. In this case, there is no pooling.
Pure pooling: National sovereign bonds are pooled, with weights equal to countries’
relative GDP over 2010-2014.10 This pool is financed by the issuance of a single
synthetic bond to benefit from diversification. In this case, there is no tranching.
Pooling and tranching: The pooled portfolio is tranched into a senior component (ES-
Bies) and a junior component (EJBies) at a given subordination level.
In what follows, we first describe the methodological design of our simulations (Sub-
section 4.1). We then analyze the securities’ quantitative properties under a benchmark
scenario (Subsection 4.2) and an adverse one (Subsection 4.3). Finally, we ask how the
exclusion of certain nation-states would affect these properties (Subsection 4.4).
These simulations are intended to provide rough guidance rather than precise answers.
They take the distribution of default and loss-given-default rates as given, and therefore
turn off general equilibrium effects. Yet by expanding the volume of safe assets that may
be held by banks, ESBies endogenously reduce the number of states in which the diabolic
loop can operate. Because this mechanism is hard to quantify empirically, Section 5
writes down a theoretical model that captures it. For now, though, by not considering
this general equilibrium effect, our simulations are conservative in that they understate
the risk reduction that ESBies can achieve.
4.1 Designing the simulations
The two main inputs are a stochastic model of default and a distribution of loss-given-
default rates for each euro area sovereign. Model calibration is guided by the principle of
conservatism regarding the potential benefits of ESBies. We use a simple and transparent
two-level hierarchical model. The first hierarchical level concerns the aggregate state of
the euro area economy. We simulate 2,000 five-year periods, in each of which the aggregate
state can take one of three values:
10 We constrain the scheme to buy no more than 100% of each nation-state’s outstanding debt. When
this constraint binds, we re-scale remaining weights so that they sum to 100%. This affects Luxembourg,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Portfolio weights are listed in column 3 of Table 1.
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State 1: A severe recession occurs; default and loss-given-default rates are very high
for all nation-states, and particularly for those with worse credit ratings. In this
scenario, the expected default rate over five years is listed in column 4 of Table 1;
expected loss-given-default rates, are shown in column 7.
State 2: A mild recession occurs; default and loss-given-default rates are elevated in all
nation-states. Expected five-year default rates are given in column 5 of Table 1;
expected loss-given-default rates are 80% of those in state 1.
State 3 : The economy expands; default risk is low for most nation-states (column 6 of
Table 1); loss-given-default rates are 50% of those in state 1.
The random variable determines that the euro area economy is in the good state
70% of the time and in one of the two recessionary states 30% of the time. This 70:30
split between expansions and recessions accords with NBER data on the US business
cycle spanning 1854-2010. Of the 30% recessionary states, similarly long time-series data
gathered by Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) and Schularick & Taylor (2012) suggest that about
one-sixth are severe. We match these historical patterns by assuming that mild recessions
occur 25% of the time and severe recessions occur 5% of the time. Robustness checks are
provided in a web appendix, available at www.euro-nomics.com.
The second hierarchical level concerns the possible default of each euro area sovereign.
Within each five-year period, conditional on the aggregate state in that period (drawn in
the first hierarchical level of the model), we take 5,000 draws of the sovereigns’ stochastic
default process. The random variable that determines whether a sovereign defaults, and
which can be interpreted as the “sunspot” in the theoretical model in Section 5), is
assumed to have a fat-tailed distribution (Student-t with 4 degrees of freedom), making
defaults far more likely than under a normal distribution. In each state of the economy,
nation-states’ default probabilities increase with their numerical credit score (higher scores
indicate worse ratings). Any two nation-states with the same credit rating are assumed
to have the same (or similar) independent probabilities of default in each aggregate state
of the world. With 2,000 five-year periods and 5,000 draws within each period, our
calibration uses a total of 10 million draws.
To check that our calibrated expected default rates in the benchmark scenario are con-
sistent with market prices, we compare them to CDS spreads. According to calculations
by Deutsche Bank, which infers default probabilities from CDS spreads by assuming a con-
stant loss-given-default rate of 40%, annual default probabilities were 0.20% for Germany
and 0.30% for the Netherlands in December 2015; by comparison, our model calculates
0.07% and 0.15% respectively. This difference can be accounted for the counterparty
credit risk and liquidity premia that inflate CDS spreads, particularly for highly rated
reference entities. For other countries for which data are available our model calculates
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precisely the same default probabilities as those implied by CDS spreads in December
2015. This cross-check with CDS spreads allows us to establish nation-states’ relative
riskiness; later, in Subsection 4.3, we subject loss rates to a stress test by building in
further cross-country dependence with four additional contagion assumptions. Further
robustness checks are provided in a web appendix.
Average loss-given-default rates in our simulations range from 36-38% for the AAA-
rated nation-states to 55% for France and 69% for Italy. According to Moody’s data
on sovereign defaults over 1983-2010, most of which were by emerging or developing
economies, issuer-weighted loss-given-default rates were 47% when measured by the post-
default versus pre-distress trading price, and 33% based on the present value of cash flows
received as a result of the distressed exchange compared with those initially promised. On
a value-weighted basis, average loss given default rates were 69% and 64% respectively.
4.2 Benchmark scenario
The purpose of our simulations is to compare the four cases along two dimensions: the
five-year expected loss rates of the different securities, calculated as average loss rates over
the simulations of the default process; and the total economy-wide volume of safe debt.
We do so in the context of a benchmark scenario, in which the model is calibrated to
give the average default and loss-given-default rates in Table 1, yielding the cross-country
correlations in default probabilities shown in Panel A of Table 2. Later, in Subsection 4.3,
we impose additional contagion assumptions which lead to the aggravated correlations
shown in Panel B of Table 2. Alternative scenarios are reported in a web appendix.
4.2.1 The effects of pooling and tranching on safety
We begin by comparing pure pooling with the status quo, before turning to tranched
securities. The horizontal line in Figure 4 marks the pooled security’s five-year expected
loss rate of 2.79%, which is slightly higher than that of Irish sovereign bonds (2.38%). By
comparison, in the status quo (with no tranching), only German, Dutch, Luxembourgish,
Austrian and Finnish bonds are safe.
Figure 5 and Table 3 show the effects of tranching by comparing the expected loss
rates of ESBies with the senior tranches of securitized national sovereign bonds. With
national tranching, the reduction in expected loss rates is minimal: no additional nation-
state clears the 0.5% safety hurdle at 10% subordination. ESBies, by comparison, benefit
more from tranching. The expected loss rate of the pooled security (2.79%) falls to 0.91%
with tranching at 10% subordination. In our base case of 30% subordination, ESBies’
expected loss rate falls to 0.09%, which is slightly lower than untranched German bunds.
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Figure 4: Untranched bonds’ five-year expected loss rates
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Note: Figure shows the expected loss rates of national sovereign bonds versus that of the pooled euro
area security without tranching. The vertical axis is truncated at 15% for presentational purposes; the
expected loss rate on Greek sovereign bonds is 34.16%. The data presented in this figure correspond to
those reported in Table 3.
Figure 5: Senior tranches’ five-year expected loss rates by subordination level
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Note: Figure shows the expected loss rates of the senior tranche of national sovereign bonds versus that
of the pooled euro area security. When the subordination level is 0%, there is no tranching: national
sovereign bonds correspond to the status quo, and the pooled security corresponds to pure pooling (as
in Figure 4). When the subordination level is greater than 0%, national sovereign bonds correspond to
national tranching, and the pooled portfolio corresponds to ESBies. For brevity, this figure displays only
the largest four nation-states; data for others are shown in Table 3.
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4.2.2 The supply of safe debt
Given the global scarcity of safe assets, maximizing their supply is a valuable policy goal,
subject to the proviso that the safe asset is backed by all euro area sovereign bonds.
We define an asset as safe if its five-year expected loss rate is 0.5% or less, so that it
would correspond approximately to a triple-A credit rating (according to the simulation
results in Table 3). We include in the securitization sovereign bonds up to 60% of national
GDP, amounting to e6.06tn (using 2014 GDP). This figure is used just for illustrative
purposes—in principle, the face value of the underlying portfolio could be higher or lower.
Figure 6 shows the volume of safe assets supplied by the different securities. With no
pooling or tranching, only German, Dutch, Luxembourgish, Austrian and Finnish bonds
are safe, leading to a safe asset supply of e2.43tn. By contrast, pure pooling leads safe
asset supply to become zero, since the expected loss rate stands at 2.79%.
Figure 6: Supply of safe assets
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Note: Gray bars refer to nation-states (i.e. the status quo when the subordination level is 0% and national
tranching when the subordination level is greater than 0%), and black bars refer to the pooled euro area
portfolio (i.e. pure pooling when the subordination level is 0% and ESBies when the subordination level
is greater than 0%). The supply of safe assets is calculated by setting the face value of the underlying
portfolio equal to 60% of euro area GDP, i.e. e6.06tn in 2014 prices.
Introducing national tranching with uniform subordination has two opposing effects
on safe asset supply. On one hand, it increases supply because the senior tranche of
additional nation-states may become safe. On the other hand, it lowers supply because
with (1 − f)% subordination only f% of safe nation-states’ debt is safe. Figure 6 shows
that only the second effect is present until 40% subordination, when the senior tranche
of French bonds become safe, leading to a modest increase in safe asset supply. To turn
off the second effect, one could “optimize” national tranching by minimizing (1 − f)%,
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such that each nation-state’s senior tranche just meets the 0.5% safety threshold. For
Germany, this minimum is 0%; for France, 40%; for Italy, 77%. Overall, optimized
national tranching generates safe asset supply of e3.79tn. This is the best that national
tranching can achieve.
ESBies do better. They are safe at a subordination level of 16%, generating e5.07tn
of safe assets—more than double safe asset supply in the status quo, and one-third greater
than under national tranching with optimized subordination levels. This quantifies the
benefit of tranching interacted with diversification.
The subordination level is a key policy variable: it affects the senior tranche’s safety
and the volume of safe assets that is generated. Our simulations point to 30% as a
reasonable middle-ground between minimizing expected loss rates and maximizing safe
asset supply: at this level, ESBies are slightly safer than the untranched German bund;
safe asset supply is nearly two times greater than the status quo, and over 40% greater
than national tranching with equivalent expected loss rates of 0.09%.
4.2.3 The attractiveness of EJBies
One might worry that the safety of ESBies comes at the expense of very risky EJBies
that no investor would want to buy. This worry is fundamentally misplaced: if investors
hold sovereign bonds, then they will also hold synthetic securities backed by these bonds.
The junior bond allows investors to leverage their exposure to sovereign risk more
cheaply than by using on-balance sheet leverage to fund a pooled portfolio of sovereign
debt. This is because the first-loss piece comes with embedded leverage, which amplifies
returns without investors using costly on-balance sheet leverage. The advantage of em-
bedded leverage can be illustrated with a simple example. Take the case of a hedge fund
seeking exposure to a diversified portfolio of sovereign bonds. Imagine that the hedge
fund wishes to enhance its return using leverage. It has two options. It could buy a pool
of sovereign bonds on margin; the prime broker would set the cost of this margin funding
at the interest rate of the hedge fund’s external funding. Alternatively, the hedge fund
could buy EJBies, in which leverage is already embedded. In this case, the leverage is
implicitly financed at the safe interest rate of ESBies, rather than at the hedge fund’s
marginal rate of external funding, which is likely to be much higher. The hedge fund can
therefore lever its portfolio more cheaply by using the leverage embedded in EJBies.
Notwithstanding the attractiveness of EJBies borne by embedded leverage, one might
still wish to gauge the riskiness of EJBies and therefore the price at which investors would
be willing to buy them. To see this, we analyze the expected loss rates of EJBies, and
compare them with those of existing sovereign bonds.
Expected five-year loss rates of the junior tranche decrease monotonically as the sub-
ordination level increases (Figure 7 and Table 4), since a larger junior tranche is available
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to bear the same quantity of losses. As with the senior tranche, the interaction of di-
versification and tranching means that EJBies’ expected loss rates fall significantly as
the subordination level increases—much more than for the junior tranches of national
sovereign bonds. At 10%, EJBies’ expected loss rate is high, at 19.70%, because losses
are absorbed by a small junior tranche. But in our base case of 30% subordination, EJBies
have a five-year expected loss rate of 9.10% and a face value of e1.82tn.
Figure 7: Junior tranches’ five-year expected loss rates by subordination level
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Note: Figure shows the expected loss rates of the junior tranche of national sovereign bonds versus that of
the pooled euro area security. The data presented in this figure correspond to those reported in Table 4.
By comparison, the bonds of the four lowest rated nation-states—Italy, Portugal,
Cyprus, and Greece—have a weighted average expected loss rate of 9.32% and a face
value of e2.7tn. Non-euro area nation-states rated BB or BBB had outstanding debt of
e4.1tn in 2012. In light of these numbers, the market will have the capacity to absorb
EJBies, particularly given that they partially supplant the stock of low-rated national
sovereign bonds actively traded on secondary markets.
4.2.4 Sub-tranching EJBies to cater to different investors
In principle, the EJB component could be sub-tranched or re-packaged in ways that make
them more desirable to investors with different risk appetites. For instance, it is possible
to sub-tranche the junior bond into a first-loss “equity” piece and a mezzanine tranche,
each catering to a different clientele, as envisaged by Corsetti, Feld, Koijen, Reichlin,
Reis, Rey & Weder Di Mauro (2016). Risk-averse investors, such as insurance companies
and pension funds, would be attracted to the mezzanine tranche; others specialized in
high-yield debt, such as hedge funds, would prefer the first-loss piece.
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We consider three sub-tranching types: a 50/50 split, whereby the equity piece com-
prises 15%, and the mezzanine tranche 15%, of the underlying face value; a two-thirds/one-
third split, whereby the equity piece comprises 20% and the mezzanine tranche 10%; and
a third case in which the equity piece comprises 25% and the mezzanine tranche 5%.
With the 50/50 split, the mezzanine tranche has an expected loss rate of 2.68%. This
is slightly lower than that of untranched Latvian sovereign bonds and slightly higher than
Irish sovereign bonds, and maps to a credit rating of approximately A (i.e. ranked 6 on a
1-22 rating scale), which is firmly investment grade. The equity tranche has an expected
loss rate of 15.52%, which is slightly higher than that of untranched Cypriot sovereign
bonds, and would be assigned a credit rating of B+ (i.e. ranked 14 on a 1-22 rating scale),
making it a “speculative” high-yield security.
As the size of the equity tranche increases, such that the mezzanine tranche is protected
by a larger first-loss piece, the expected loss rate of the mezzanine tranche falls. With a
10% mezzanine tranche and a 20% equity tranche, the expected loss rate of the mezzanine
falls to 2.40%, which is similar to that of status quo Irish sovereign bonds and maps to
a credit rating of approximately A+ (i.e. ranked 5 on a 1-22 rating scale). With a 5%
mezzanine tranche and a 25% equity tranche, the expected loss rate of the mezzanine falls
to 1.54%, which is similar to that of untranched Belgian bonds and maps to a rating of
AA (i.e. ranked 3 on a 1-22 rating scale).
Similarly, the expected loss rate of the equity tranche decreases as its size increases,
since the same quantum of losses is spread over a larger tranche. With a 5%/25% split
between the mezzanine and equity tranches, the equity tranche has an expected loss rate of
10.61%, which is slightly below that of untranched Portuguese sovereign bonds and below
investment grade. At this level of riskiness, the equity tranche would be an attractive
investment proposition for hedge funds and other specialized investors in high-yield debt.
4.3 Adverse scenario
In the benchmark scenario, defaults are idiosyncratic events. All commonality in defaults
comes from credit ratings conditional on the aggregate state, namely whether the euro
area economy is in the catastrophic state 1, bad state 2, or good state 3. To consider
a more adverse scenario, we build in further cross-country dependence. This provides a
pessimistic robustness check and allows us to evaluate how ESBies would perform in an
adverse scenario relative to other security designs. We make four additional contagion
assumptions, imposed sequentially in the following order:
1. Whenever there is a German default, others default with 50% probability.
2. Whenever there is a French default, other nation-states default with 40% probability,
except the five highest rated nation-states, which default with 10% probability.
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3. Whenever there is an Italian default, the five highest rated nation-states default with
5% probability; the next three nation-states (France, Belgium and Estonia) default
with 10% probability; and the other nation-states default with 40% probability—
unless any of these nation-states had defaulted at step 1 or 2.
4. Whenever there is a Spanish default, the five highest rated nation-states default with
5% probability; the next three nation-states default with 10% probability; and the
other nation-states default with 40% probability—unless any of these nation-states
had defaulted at step 1, 2 or 3.11
These contagion assumptions substantially increase the correlation of defaults across
nation-states, as is evident in Panel B (relative to Panel A) of Table 2. The first principal
component of defaults now explains 42% of covariation in default rates, compared with
29% in the benchmark scenario, and the first three principal components account for
64% of the covariation compared to 57% before. Table 5 shows the conditional default
probabilities, which given the way we built the adverse scenario have the feature that euro
area nation-states are very sensitive to the default of Germany, France, Italy or Spain.
Five-year expected loss rates for status quo sovereign bonds are much higher than in
the benchmark scenario (Table 6). Now, only untranched German sovereign bonds are
safe, so that safe asset supply stands at e1.70tn, down from e2.43tn in the benchmark
scenario. France’s expected loss rate increases from 0.50% in the benchmark to 1.94% in
the adverse scenario; Spain’s from 4.90% to 6.80%; and Italy’s from 5.63% to 7.22%.
Only pooling or only tranching does not increase safe asset supply. The expected
loss rate of the pooled security rises from 2.79% in the benchmark scenario to 3.84% in
the adverse scenario. With national tranching, only the five highest rated nation-states’
senior bonds are safe with 30% subordination, so total safe debt is e1.70tn. One must
increase the subordination rate to 50% for French senior bonds to qualify, and even then
the peak amount of safe debt is only e1.86tn.
Again, ESBies make a significant difference. In our base case of 30% subordination, the
expected loss rate is 0.42%, compared with 0.09% in the benchmark scenario. Therefore,
even in this adverse scenario, ESBies would be slightly safer than untranched German
bunds. In terms of safe asset supply, ESBies are even more beneficial (relative to the
status quo) in the adverse scenario than in the benchmark scenario, since they generate
e4.22tn of safe debt in either.
11 These four additional contagion assumptions are applied sequentially in the order in which they
are described. For example, if there is a German default at step 1, all other nation-states default with a
probability of 50%. If France then defaults at step 2—which if Germany defaults happens with 50% prob-
ability, but if Germany does not default happens with probability pd1=25%, pd2=3% or pd3=0.05%—the
nation-states with a credit rating superior to France’s default with probability 10%, if they had not al-
ready defaulted, while those with an inferior rating default with probability 40%. After this second step,
we add the default events to those from the first step. So if a nation-state had not defaulted after step
1, but defaults in step 2 after France’s default, then it has defaulted after steps 1 and 2 taken together.
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ESBies’ safety is ensured by the junior tranche, which naturally is riskier in the adverse
scenario than in the benchmark one. With 30% subordination, EJBies’ five-year expected
loss rate is 11.81%, compared with 9.10% in the benchmark scenario. Nevertheless, EJBies
could still be sub-tranched to create an investment grade 15%-thick mezzanine tranche
with an expected loss rate of 6.38%, protected by a 15%-thick first-loss piece with an
expected loss rate of 17.24%.
4.4 Exclusion of certain nation-states from the securitization
The premise of ESBies is that they should be created out of a diversified portfolio that
comprises the sovereign bonds of all euro area member states. This ensures that ESBies
eliminate cross-border flight-to-safety capital flows. Excluding certain nation-states from
the securitization would negate some of the welfare improvement from creating ESBies.
This section abstracts from these welfare considerations to investigate the marginal
effect on the properties of ESBies of excluding certain nation-states. There are two ef-
fects of such an exclusion: a volume effect, by which the face value of the senior tranche
is reduced (holding the subordination level fixed), and a risk effect, which captures the
change in the size of the senior tranche owing to the change in subordination required to
keep ESBies’ expected loss rate constant. The volume effect of excluding any nation-state
is always negative; the risk effect is negative for low risk nation-states, and positive for
riskier nation-states. The volume effect always dominates the risk effect, even for risky
nation-states such as Greece; consequently, the exclusion of any nation-state unambigu-
ously reduces the supply of safe assets for given cross-country default correlations. Note
that if correlations were to increase endogenously following the inclusion of a nation-state,
the positive risk effect may dominate the negative volume effect. The mechanism that
could yield such an increase in correlations is opaque to us, however, and in Section 5
we find that union-wide ESBies would have the opposite effect, resulting in a decrease in
cross-country correlations.
To see why the volume effect dominates the risk effect, we compare our base case—in
which ESBies with 30% subordination generate e4.22tn of safe assets in the benchmark
scenario—with alternative synthetic securities that exclude Italy and, in a separate ex-
ercise, Spain. These two countries are chosen arbitrarily for their size and moderate
riskiness; in unreported results, we conduct similar exercises for other countries, with
qualitatively similar findings.
Without Italy, safe asset supply stands at e3.54tn; Spain’s exclusion puts it at e3.78tn
(holding the subordination level constant at 30%). These reductions of e0.68tn and
e0.44tn (relative to the e4.22tn benchmark) represent the negative volume effect. In
both cases, however, the same level of safety can be achieved with a lower subordination
level: 24% without Italy, and 28% without Spain. These adjustments lead to positive
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risk effects of e0.30tn and e0.11tn respectively, resulting in safe asset supply of e3.84tn
without Italy and e3.89tn without Spain. The volume effect dominates the risk effect,
such that the overall impact on safe asset supply of excluding any given nation-state from
the securitization is negative for a fixed correlation structure. This conclusion holds even
if the excluded nation-state’s debt were individually tranched.12
The key insight is that there is no trade-off between the union-wide, proportionate
provision of the safe asset and maximization of the volume of safe assets for fixed correla-
tion structures. This is because each nation-state’s debt contains a component, however
small, that with tranching can be made safe. We conclude that ESBies should be backed
by all euro area nation-states. This engenders two benefits: first, it turns off distortionary
flight-to-safety flows of capital during crises; second, it maximizes the supply of safe assets.
5 Modeling the diabolic loop
The simulations presented in the previous section are based on fixed estimates of sovereign
default probabilities and correlations. However, probabilities would change if euro area
banks were to reduce the home bias of their sovereign portfolios, either by holding a diver-
sified pool of bonds or by holding ESBies. Since there is no historical case of such portfolio
rebalancing, we turn to theoretical analysis to understand how default probabilities and
their correlations would change with different compositions of banks’ sovereign portfolios.
The structure of banks’ sovereign portfolios affects sovereign default probabilities for
the reasons described in Section 2. Insofar as banks hold fewer domestic sovereign bonds,
home-grown sovereign risk is less likely to destabilize the banks, which in turn mitigates
concerns about sovereigns’ solvency. On the other hand, if banks hold more foreign
sovereign bonds, they become more exposed to the solvency risk of foreign sovereigns, so
that shocks may spread across borders via the balance sheets of banks.
We analyze these issues through the lens of a model of the diabolic loop. Brunnermeier
et al. (2016) focus on the polar cases in which banks hold only domestic sovereign debt,
equally-weighted domestic and foreign sovereign debt, or ESBies. We extend their model
to a continuum of portfolios, spanning the entire spectrum from complete home bias to
complete diversification, either via pooling or pooling-cum-tranching. This extension is
important from a policy perspective because future prudential regulation is unlikely to
induce complete diversification, even if it reduces the extent of banks’ home bias.
Our analysis uncovers three main results. First, without tranching, international di-
versification of banks’ sovereign portfolios can be a blessing (if banks are well capitalized)
12 The minimum subordination level at which the Italian (Spanish) senior tranche is safe is 77% (76%).
Safe asset supply with national tranching is therefore e0.23bn for Italy and e0.16bn for Spain. Even if
we were to add these figures to the positive risk effect, the negative volume effect still dominates.
18
or a curse (if they are weakly capitalized). Second, ESBies reduce the number of states in
which contagion can occur and expands those in which no diabolic loop can occur. Third,
the extent to which ESBies have this effect depends on their design: greater subordination
enhances the safety of ESBies, as shown numerically in Section 4, and therefore reduces
the number of states in which the diabolic loop can occur.
5.1 The model
Here, we present the layout of the model and its main results graphically, and leave the
detailed presentation of assumptions and derivations to the Mathematical Appendix.
In the model, there are two countries, each populated by four agents: (i) the govern-
ment, which prefers higher to lower output, as this is associated with greater tax revenue;
(ii) dispersed depositors, who run on insolvent banks if the government does not bail them
out, and also pay taxes; (iii) bank equity holders, who hold all of their capital in initial
bank equity, so that they cannot recapitalize banks subsequently; and (iv) investors in
government bonds, whose beliefs determine the price of sovereign debt.13 The two coun-
tries are identical, so there is no loss of generality in focusing the analysis only on one of
them, which we shall refer to as the domestic country.
Initially, there is a unit-size outstanding supply of zero-coupon domestic sovereign
bonds with face value S > 0. Domestic banks are endowed with a sovereign bond portfolio
that may include domestic sovereign bonds, a pooled security (comprising domestic and
foreign sovereign bonds in equal weights), or some combination of both. We express banks’
holdings of domestic sovereign bonds as a fraction α of the total face value S, so that
the face value of banks’ domestic holdings is αS. Likewise, we express banks’ holdings of
the pooled security as a fraction β of S, so that the face value of banks’ holdings of the
pooled security is βS.14 The total face value of banks’ overall sovereign portfolio is then
(α + β)S = γS. Note that β can be interpreted as an indicator of the extent to which
banks’ portfolios are diversified. Beside sovereign debt securities, banks’ assets include
loans L0 to the real economy. Their liabilities are formed by deposits D0 and equity. The
market value of equity depends on the market price of sovereign debt.
Now consider the case in which the pooled security is tranched. Banks hold some
portion of the senior tranche (ESBies), while the junior tranche (EJBies) is held exclusively
13 For simplicity, we assume that all agents are risk neutral. There is no discounting, so the risk-free
interest rate is zero. Short-term deposits yield extra utility compared to long-term government debt due
to their convenience value in performing transactions. This is necessary to justify the demand for bank
deposits backed by sovereign debt. Otherwise, banks would not need to hold sovereign debt.
14 We normalize one unit of the pooled security to face value S. This is only a normalization: it does
not imply that the total face value of the pooled security is S. For example, if only a small amount of
the pooled security is created, its face value will be much smaller than that of the outstanding supply of
domestic sovereign bonds.
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by non-bank investors.15 In this case, we still denote the face value of banks’ holdings of
ESBies by βS. Hence, the total face value of banks’ overall sovereign portfolio remains
(α + β)S = γS. Note that face value βS of ESBies is obtained by tranching face value
βS
f
of the pooled security, where f is one minus the subordination level.
The model is composed of four periods (0, 1, 2, 3), shown in Figure 8. At t = 0,
government bonds in both countries trade at price B0. A fraction α of each country’s
bonds are owned by domestic banks, and some may be pooled with the bonds issued by
the foreign country, and possibly tranched, with banks holding a fraction β of this pooled
security. The marked-to-market value of banks’ equity in periods t = 0 and t = 1 is equal
to a constant E0 plus the capital gains on banks’ sovereign bond holdings relative to their
book value, i.e. E0 + (α+ β2 )(Bt − S) + β2 (Bft − S), where we reserve the notation Bt for
the market price of the domestic bond and use Bft for the price of the foreign bond. (The
two prices can differ in period 1.) We assume that 0 < E0 < (α + β)S; this implies that
if the market value of the banks’ entire portfolio of sovereign debt were to become zero,
banks would have negative equity.
Figure 8: Model timeline
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Note: At t = 1, a sunspot occurs with probability p independently in each country. If it occurs, sovereign
bonds fall in value; when the price drop is sufficiently large, banks cannot roll over their lending to the real
economy. At t = 2, the government decides whether to bail out the banks. At t = 3, the government’s
surplus is revealed. The payoff to bondholders is the size of that surplus minus any reduction in tax
revenue (owing to the credit crunch) at t = 1 and the cost of the bail-out (if it took place) at t = 2.
At t = 1, a sunspot—i.e. a confidence crisis—occurs with probability p independently
in each country. This sunspot carries no fundamental information, and can be interpreted
as the random variable that governs whether each nation-state defaults in each draw of
the simulation in Section 4. If the sunspot occurs, non-bank investors become pessimistic
15 In Subsection 6.1.3, we envisage allowing banks to hold EJBies, subject to a punitive risk weight.
Our modeling assumption—that non-banks are the exclusive holders of EJBies—can be interpreted in
the sense that risk weights would be so punitive that banks decide not to hold any EJBies.
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about the government’s ability to repay its obligations at t = 3. This causes the price of
government bonds at t = 1, B1, to drop, reducing the marked-to-market value of banks’
equity. If this repricing renders the market value of banks’ equity negative, banks cannot
roll-over maturing loans of size ψL0, leading to an equal output loss that reduces the
government’s revenue by τψL0 ≥ 0 at t = 3. Hence, investors’ pessimism can by itself
generate a credit crunch that weakens the government’s fiscal position.
At t = 2, if a sunspot occurred at t = 1, the government must decide whether to bail
out banks, before discovering its tax revenue at t = 3. If the government chooses not to
bail out, insolvent banks are unable to roll-over a further ψL0 of maturing loans, resulting
in a deeper credit crunch and even lower tax revenues at t = 3. If instead the government
bails out the banks, it must issue additional government bonds, which are given to the
banks as extra assets.
Finally, at date t = 3, the government’s fiscal surplus is realized, and all consumption
takes place. If no sunspot occurred, the surplus is just the stochastic variable S, which
is low (S) with probability pi and high (S > S) with probability 1 − pi. If a sunspot
occurred at t = 1 and a bail-out occurred at t = 2, the surplus is equal to S, minus
the tax loss τψL0 due to the credit crunch at t = 1, minus the cost of recapitalizing the
banks. For example, in the case in which banks hold only domestic bonds (β = 0), they
are in need of recapitalization if the reduction in the value of their bonds, α(B0 −B1), is
greater than their equity at t = 0, E0 +α(B0−S), or equivalently if their equity at t = 1,
E0 +α(B1−S), is negative. The probability that the government defaults at t = 3 is the
probability that the fiscal surplus is lower than S.
5.2 The diabolic loop in equilibrium
In the absence of any pooling or tranching, and under suitable parameter restrictions,
there are two possible equilibria. If investors do not expect the government to bail out
the domestic banks, they will also expect that the government will be able to repay the
promised amount S, even with a low realization of the surplus. As a result, banks will
not suffer a capital loss regardless of their portfolio composition.
But if banks’ initial equity is sufficiently low, a second equilibrium—the diabolic loop—
can arise. Investors expect the government to bail out banks, eroding the value of govern-
ment bonds at t = 1. This erosion triggers the need to recapitalize the banks, which—in
tandem with the recessionary effect of the attendant credit crunch—validates the initial
bail-out expectation, leading to a sovereign default in the bad state (when S = S). The
sunspot picks this bad equilibrium with probability p. Note the time-inconsistency prob-
lem at the root of this bad equilibrium: if the government could credibly commit to never
bail out banks, the diabolic loop could not arise.
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Importantly, the diabolic loop equilibrium can occur if the fraction of domestic sovereign
debt held by banks exceeds a threshold value relative to banks’ equity. In this case, if
investors become pessimistic due to the sunspot, the sovereign debt repricing will make
banks insolvent, prompting the government to bail them out, which in turn precipitates
sovereign default and justifies the investors’ pessimism. Policymakers can reduce the prob-
ability of a diabolic loop, or even exclude it entirely, by increasing bank equity require-
ments and reducing the fraction α of domestic sovereign bonds that banks are permitted
to hold. However, if banks are not well capitalized, reducing the fraction α of domestic
sovereign bonds held by banks and increasing the fraction of β of the pooled security held
by banks increases their vulnerability to a foreign sunspot.
This is best understood with graphs; the Mathematical Appendix contains the un-
derlying analysis. Domestic banks are initially endowed with a fraction α of domestic
sovereign bonds and β of the pooled security, with the overall size of their sovereign bond
portfolio, α+β, held constant. In Figure 9, the parameter E0 that characterizes bank eq-
uity is on the horizontal axis, and the degree of diversification of banks’ sovereign portfolio,
β, is on the vertical axis. The parameter γ ≡ α + β, which characterizes the overall size
of banks’ sovereign bond portfolio, is held constant. Complete home bias corresponds to
β = 0; complete diversification (in which domestic banks hold an equal-weighted portfolio
of domestic and foreign sovereign bonds) corresponds to β = γ.
Consider first the case of no tranching, shown in Panel A of Figure 9. When E0
exceeds the critical value γpiτψL0, banks are so well capitalized that the diabolic loop
cannot occur, even if banks’ sovereign debt portfolios are composed entirely of domestic
debt (i.e. β = 0), and regardless of the subordination level. In this case, a sovereign
bond sell-off would be unjustified even following a global sunspot, because banks’ initial
equity is so large that the government could recapitalize them without defaulting. Hence,
in equilibrium no bond repricing would occur at date t = 1.
For values of E0 below γpiτψL0 (but not too low), if banks hold a well-diversified
portfolio of sovereign debt (i.e. with sufficiently high β), a local sunspot—that is, a
loss of confidence in the solvency of the home country only—cannot trigger the diabolic
loop. In this diversification region, the repricing of banks’ sovereign portfolios following
a local sunspot is so limited that they do not become insolvent. However, the benefits of
diversification are absent in the event of a global sunspot, when a simultaneous diabolic
loop in both countries can still occur, although only with probability p2.
For even lower values of E0 or lower levels of diversification β, there exists the uncor-
related diabolic loop region, in which diversification is too limited to bring either benefit or
harm. In this region, a country-specific sunspot will trigger the diabolic loop only in the
country concerned. Hence, the probability of a diabolic loop occurring in the domestic
country being triggered is simply that of a sunspot occurring there, i.e. p.
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For even lower E0 or higher β, one enters the contagion region, in which diversification
turns from a blessing into a curse. Here, a country-specific sunspot triggers a global
diabolic loop: given banks’ weak capitalization and diversified portfolios, a sunspot in
either country brings down the banks and sovereign in both countries. In this region,
from the perspective of each country, the probability of the diabolic loop being triggered,
i.e. p2 + p(1− p), is larger than in the region with uncorrelated diabolic loops, where the
probability is p. In the spirit of Wagner (2010), full diversification (without tranching) by
individual institutions can facilitate contagion across countries. The policy lesson is that
simply increasing banks’ diversification (without ESBies) may be harmful rather than
beneficial if they are poorly capitalized, as it will increase contagion.
5.3 ESBies: shift to a new equilibrium
Figure 9 shows that if banks were to use ESBies to diversify their sovereign portfolios, the
contagion region would shrink compared to the case of no tranching, and the region in
which no diabolic loop can occur would expand at the expense of the diversification region.
As such, the potential for a local sunspot triggering a global crisis would decrease, and
so would its ability to trigger a local crisis. The intuition for this result is that tranching
shifts default risks to junior bond holders outside of the banking sector. Tranching is thus
a positive sum game, as it reduces the endogenous risk of a diabolic loop.
The extent of these beneficial effects of ESBies is determined by their degree of sub-
ordination, which increases from Panel B to C in Figure 9. In fact, if subordination were
very high, both the contagion and the diversification regions are eliminated. Of course, as
we know from the simulations in Section 4, choosing a very high degree of subordination
also reduces the supply of ESBies, so it does not come as a free lunch.
These figures illustrate that the probability of sovereign defaults and their cross-
country correlation are both affected by the structure of banks’ balance sheets. Specif-
ically, the probability of default depends on bank capitalization; the diversification of
banks’ sovereign portfolios; and whether diversification takes place with or without tranch-
ing. The diabolic loop equilibrium can be avoided if banks are adequately capitalized. At
lower levels of bank equity, the possibility of a diabolic loop equilibrium can still be avoided
if banks hold ESBies. Without tranching, diversification can increase the probability of
a diabolic loop by facilitating cross-country contagion. Accordingly, by introducing ES-
Bies and incentivizing banks to hold them, policymakers would lower the probability of
sovereign defaults and reduce their cross-country correlation.
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Figure 9: Diabolic loop regions by ESBies’ subordination level
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Note: Figure analyzes the case in which there is tranching at no (Panel A), low (Panel B) and high
(Panel C) levels of subordination. As subordination increases, the no diabolic loop region increases, while
the other regions shrink. In the limit, when subordination is very high, the contagion and diversification
regions disappear.
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6 Laying the groundwork for ESBies
ESBies are innovative sovereign debt securities. In this section, we describe how the new
securities would function in financial markets, and the decisions that policymakers would
need to take to lay the groundwork for their creation. We ask and answer: (i) How would
ESBies integrate with banking regulation? (ii) To what standards should their issuance
adhere? (iii) Who would issue ESBies? (iv) How would they interact with sovereign bond
issuance? (v) How would sovereign debt restructuring change in the presence of ESBies?
6.1 Future reform of banking regulation
Breaking the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk is a major aim of reg-
ulatory reform in Europe (Juncker, Tusk, Dijsselbloem, Draghi & Schulz, 2015). To
date, policymakers have pursued this objective by improving the resilience of banks and
sovereigns in isolation. Banks are subject to tighter capital requirements and stricter
resolution rules, and sovereigns have improved their fiscal balance and acquired access to
emergency lending facilities. These measures weaken the diabolic loop, but they are not
sufficient because they do not reduce banks’ exposures to their domestic sovereign.
6.1.1 Status quo in EU banking regulation
Banking regulation facilitates home bias in banks’ sovereign bond portfolios by setting
risk weights on exposures to central governments at zero and exempting these portfolios
from normal large exposure limits (European Systemic Risk Board, 2015).16 As a result,
euro area banks may hold sovereign bonds without funding them with any equity (as
long as the leverage ratio requirement does not bind). This is logically inconsistent with
the “no-bail-out” clause in the Lisbon Treaty, which is founded on the premise that
the commitments of governments are risky, and in certain states of the world might
be defaulted upon. The absence of any capital charge incentivizes banks to hold risky
sovereign bonds rather than other assets of similar riskiness, particularly when capital
requirements bind. Furthermore, zero risk weights create a double moral hazard problem
when sovereign risk increases: politicians encourage local banks to buy local sovereign
bonds, and banks realize that holding these sovereign bonds allows them to collectively
correlate their risks (Farhi & Tirole, 2016). In sum, the regulatory status quo gives banks
a strong incentive to load up on sovereign risk in a socially inefficient way.
16 See 114(4) and 400(1a) of the EU Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). While the 0% risk weight
applies only to exposures denominated and funded in domestic currency, 114(5) grants a transitional
exemption until end-2017 for holdings denominated in foreign currency. And although 114(4) pertains
only to the standardized approach, article 150 provides authorities with the discretion to grant internal
ratings-based banks a “permanent partial use” of the standardized approach. Competent authorities may
revoke permission for this “permanent partial use”, but few have done so.
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6.1.2 ESBies as the complement of regulatory reform
If these regulations are so damaging, why do they persist? Why not assign risk weights
to sovereign debt or impose limits on concentrated holdings?
Without ESBies, the implementation of such reforms would clash with liquidity regu-
lation. To satisfy the liquidity coverage ratio requirement, banks must hold enough high
quality liquid assets to meet their outflows over a 30-day stress scenario. In a new regula-
tory regime, these holdings would be subject to a capital charge. If capital charges were
set as a function of the measured riskiness of sovereign debt, banks would prefer to satisfy
liquidity requirements by holding low-risk sovereign debt. The interaction of liquidity
requirements with risk-based capital charges could therefore generate a regulatory-driven
flight to safety from vulnerable to less vulnerable nation-states.
ESBies would avoid this outcome. Banks could satisfy liquidity requirements by hold-
ing a zero risk-weighted synthetic security that is backed by the sovereign bonds of all
euro area nation-states. This security would be liquid and safe, and should not be subject
to any capital charge, as we explain in the next section. Moreover, the increase in safe
asset supply from issuing ESBies ensures that banks could satisfy their latent demand for
a liquid and safe store of value without needing to grapple with safe asset scarcity.
Another argument against risk-based capital charges rests on their procyclicality and
its systemic implications. Mechanically raising the risk weight on sovereign debt in a
crisis might lead banks to sell bonds, which in turn might lower the price of these bonds
and amplify risky sovereigns’ troubles. With a union-wide safe asset there would be no
fire sales of sovereign bonds by banks in a crisis: ESBies’ safety ensures that banks would
not suffer capital losses when their sovereign encounters difficulties.
Alternatively, regulators could set capital charges as a function of banks’ concentration
in individual sovereign issuers, or hard limits on banks’ exposures to issuers. In this
regime, banks are incentivized to diversify their portfolios, avoiding a regulatory-driven
flight to safety. However, this would come with two side effects. First, banks would hold
a diversified portfolio of sovereign debt without the seniority offered by tranching. The
numerical simulations in Section 4 revealed that such a portfolio would not, in fact, be safe.
Tranching is necessary to achieve safety. Additionally, the theoretical model in Section 5
showed that diversification without tranching can facilitate cross-border contagion. When
banks are weakly capitalized, such contagion can strengthen, rather than weaken, the
diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk.
The second side effect of concentration-based capital charges or large exposure limits
is that they might incentivize only partial diversification. Banks may decide to diversify
into only the most liquid sovereign bond markets, given that the five largest nation-states
together account for more than four-fifths of euro area GDP. With a partially diversified
portfolio comprised of five nation-states’ sovereign bonds, the marginal diversification ben-
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efit of adding an extra issuer to that portfolio would be minimal. Relatively small frictions
in banks’ ability to operate in other sovereign bond markets might therefore be sufficient
to dissuade them from achieving full diversification. Consequently, smaller nation-states
with relatively illiquid sovereign bond markets would be penalized by concentration-based
capital charges. The existence of ESBies would solve this conundrum, as they represent
a highly liquid security that banks could buy with minimal transaction costs. As ESBies
are proportionally backed by the sovereign bonds of all euro area nation states, smaller
countries would not be penalized by regulatory reform.
In sum, ESBies are the missing piece that would enable the completion of bank regu-
latory reform, with either risk-based or concentration-based capital charges or limits on
banks’ holdings of sovereign debt. As part of that reform, bank regulators would need
to decide on how to treat ESBies (such that banks are incentivized to hold them rather
than national sovereign debt) and EJBies (such that regulatory arbitrage is precluded).
We turn to that question next.
6.1.3 Risk weights on ESBies and EJBies
The defining characteristic of ESBies is that they are safe. To reflect this, and to encourage
their issuance, bank regulators should exempt ESBies from ordinary capital charges and
exposure limits. This regulatory choice is analogous to that made in the United States,
where federal Treasuries have a zero risk weight but municipal and state bonds do not.
EJBies, instead, are risky securities and should be treated by regulators as such. If
they were not, banks would be able to arbitrage regulation (by holding EJBies rather
than ESBies or national sovereign bonds) and the diabolic loop would partly remain.
Take a bank holding a portfolio with a share f of ESBies and a share 1 − f of EJBies,
where 1− f is the subordination level. This is equivalent to holding the portfolio of the
underlying sovereign bonds. Therefore, if the weighted-average risk weight of directly
held sovereign bonds were X%, and since the risk weight of ESBies is fixed at zero, the
risk weight of the EJBies must be X1−f%, so that 0f +
X
1−f (1 − f) = X%. Importantly,
this application of the “look-through principle” takes into account the tranching structure
embedded in the asset-backed security. Similar considerations apply to the regulation of
insurers, investment funds, and other financial institutions.
6.2 The ESBies’ Handbook
ESBies must be homogeneous. This is important for them to be highly liquid and trans-
parent. Homogeneity can be ensured by a process of ESB-certification that is trusted
by market participants. Each authorized ESB-issuer must adhere to common guidelines
laid out in an ESBies’ Handbook. A security created according to these guidelines would
27
then be awarded a “license number” that certifies it as a legitimate ESB. The Handbook
could be developed by an existing public body in collaboration with stakeholders includ-
ing countries’ Debt Management Offices, potential ESB-issuers and would-be purchasers
of ESBies and EJBies, and the licensing scheme could be run by the same institution.
Three features of ESBies are particularly important to standardize: the subordination
level, the portfolio weights, and the allocation of the arbitrage margin resulting from
different liquidity premia. These features should be fixed and revised only infrequently,
and should be applied strictly without scope for deviation.
6.2.1 Subordination level
The subordination level determines the safety of ESBies and the volume of safe debt that
may be issued. The Handbook should set this level so that it is the same across ESBies.17
As we highlight in Section 4, the choice of the subordination level embeds a trade-off
between ESBies’ safety and the volume of safe debt that can be issued. Our base case
subordination level is 30%, at which ESBies would be slightly safer than German bunds,
while doubling the supply of safe assets.
6.2.2 Portfolio weights
To reflect ESBies’ status as a union-wide asset, portfolio weights should be set according
to nation-states’ relative contributions to euro area GDP.18 To avoid sudden changes in
weights, owing for example to a severe recession in one country, it would be preferable to
calculate a moving average of countries’ relative GDPs with a window of, say, five years;
similarly, one could assign weights in proportion to national central banks’ shares in the
ECB’s capital, which is slow-moving by design. In general, weight recalculations should
be done infrequently, preserving a high degree of homogeneity among outstanding ESBies.
One problem with the GDP-weighting or ECB capital rule is that several nation-
states in the euro area have little public debt outstanding relative to their GDP. As of
2015, the nation-state with the lowest debt-to-GDP ratio was Estonia (at 10%), followed
by Luxembourg (21%), Latvia (36%), Lithuania (43%) and Slovakia (53%), as shown
in column 2 of Table 1. A simple solution would be to modify the portfolio weights
17 Alternatively, the Handbook could specify that ESBies must have a modeled expected loss rate of,
say, 0.5% over five years. We prefer to harmonize the subordination level, as it is a transparent and
objective characteristic of the securitization. By contrast, risk modeling is a subjective exercise that
could be subject to manipulation by ESB-issuers.
18 Some commentators have suggested that the weights should instead be set according to nation-
states’ outstanding public debt, thereby reflecting the “market portfolio”. If implemented, such a weight-
ing scheme would embed a severe moral hazard problem. By issuing more debt, nation-states could
increase their weighting in the securitization, and thereby increase the demand for their debt from ESB-
issuers. This might induce a “race to the top” in public debt issuance which in the limit could generate
unsustainable debt dynamics.
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once ESBies include all of a nation-state’s outstanding bonds, with the weights on the
remaining elements of the portfolio being scaled up proportionally.
The problem with this simple re-weighting scheme is that ESB-issuers would buy
all of the outstanding debt of certain nation-states, such that price formation could no
longer take place. For other nation-states, ESB-issuers would buy most of the outstanding
bonds, so that price formation might be distorted by low market liquidity. To overcome
this problem, the ESBies’ Handbook could adopt the rule followed by the ECB in the
implementation of its public sector purchase program. In the case of ESBies, this means
that the underlying pool would include only up to k% of a nation-state’s outstanding
bonds, with the ESB-issuer purchasing these bonds at the market price of the 1−k% that
would still be traded on secondary markets. When the k% constraint binds, the weights
on the remaining elements of the portfolio would be scaled up proportionally so that the
weights sum to 100%. Higher k would reduce the need for weight recalculations, but at
the expense of making secondary markets for national sovereign bonds thinner.
6.2.3 Market liquidity
Thinner secondary markets for national sovereign bonds would feature higher liquidity
premia (Foucault, Pagano & Ro¨ell, 2013). But these higher liquidity premia in national
markets would be offset by the creation of new, much larger and therefore highly liquid
markets for ESBies and EJBies. As a result, the liquidity premium on ESBies and EJBies
would be lower than the weighted-average liquidity premia on the national sovereign
bonds from which they are created. In securitizations, this mismatch is called the “excess
spread” or “arbitrage margin”.
The accrual and allocation of this arbitrage margin should be regulated in the ESBies’
Handbook. One possibility would be to deposit in a residual interest tranche all of the
arbitrage margin accrued over the life of the securitization. If a default occurs, this residual
interest tranche would cover the first loss, providing additional protection to EJB holders.
If no default occurs, then the residual interest tranche could be disbursed to nation-states.
Disbursement could take place according to nation-states’ weights in the securitization.
Alternatively, a more refined disbursement arrangement would compensate nation-states
in proportion to the cost that they bear in terms of higher liquidity premia following the
advent of ESBies. In this way, ESBies could be Pareto improving in terms of the overall
liquidity premium paid by each nation-state.
6.3 Who would issue ESBies?
ESBies can, in principle, be issued by any entity. The two most likely candidates are
either the securitization vehicles of private financial institutions, such as large banks
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or asset managers; or a public institution, such as the European Stability Mechanism,
European Investment Bank or European Central Bank, or even a new “European Debt
Agency” (EDA). This choice does not need to be exclusive: ESBies could be issued by
some combination of private and public entities. Our proposal is consistent with any of
these options.
6.3.1 Public versus private
Assigning responsibility for issuing ESBies to a single public institution would ensure
that the instruments possess homogeneous characteristics. The ESBies’ Handbook would
be fully respected, as the public institution would have no incentive to deviate from
the Handbook’s specifications or engage in market manipulation. Moreover, a public
institution could be depended upon for continuous issuance even during banking crises,
when some private financial institutions might have their functions impaired.
A public ESB-issuer must be independent from political interference with respect to the
design of ESBies. This creates a governance challenge, requiring substantial investment
of political capital, and perhaps new EU legislation.19 By contrast, issuance by private
financial institutions would not require any legal change, and would exploit the fact that
many of these institutions have pre-existing expertise in securitizations. In fact, they
are likely to find ESB-issuance attractive: securitization is more complex than market-
making in sovereign bond markets by primary dealers, such that the ESB-issuers could
charge appropriate fees. Private-sector issuers could also compete to design differently
sub-tranched junior securities that are most attractive to investors, while ensuring that
ESBies are designed in accordance with the Handbook.
Each prospective issuer must obtain prior authorization to issue ESBies from a public
licensing body. In the case of public issuance, the public institution would receive its
authority directly from legislation. In the case of private issuance, a licensing body,
which could well be an existing institution, would authorize private-sector ESB-issuers.
If both private and public issuance were to co-exist, then the licensing body could be the
same as the public issuer.
Licenses for ESB-issuance would be given to reputable private financial institutions
that fulfill some requirements. The institution must have the necessary financial exper-
tise and experience, and demonstrate capacity to continue to issue ESBies during crises.
Beyond these basic requirements, it is important to ensure that the holders of ESBies do
not face counterparty credit risk.
19 One might be concerned that the EDA might be unable to place EJBies during a stress scenario.
But the EDA could always place EJBies at some market-clearing price: EJBies would remain attractive
to high-yield investors owing to their embedded leverage and high liquidity. Moreover, the EDA should
be required by law to place EJBies as soon as the securitization takes place.
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6.3.2 Minimizing counterparty risk
Counterparty risk might arise due to risk of default by the issuer, legal risk, or moral
hazard in forming and monitoring the portfolio of bonds.
Counterparty default risk: ESB securitizations can be made bankruptcy-remote from the
issuer’s own balance sheet by using special purpose vehicles to hold the underlying
portfolios of bonds. Thus, in case of default of the issuer, resolution procedures
would be able to easily extract the ESB operations of the issuer from the rest of its
activities, and carry on servicing and honoring previously issued ESBies.
Counterparty legal risk: The public licensing body could require ESB-issuers to operate
only in jurisdictions with reliable legal frameworks. The body could even require
issuance to take place in a single jurisdiction, so that all ESBies are subject to the
same laws.
Counterparty moral hazard: Issuers of asset-backed securities are usually subject to two
types of moral hazard. The first is in selecting the underlying asset pool. This
risk is absent in the case of ESBies because the issuers would have no discretion
with respect to asset selection. The second source of moral hazard is in monitoring
the corresponding debtors and enforcing payments. Because the underlying pool is
made of sovereign bonds that continue to be traded in markets, the collection of
payments takes minimal effort. Therefore, it is not necessary to have the ESB-issuer
hold “skin in the game”, by holding a tranche junior to all others, in order to align
their incentives with EJB holders.
6.4 Dealing with diversity in sovereign bond issuance
ESB-issuers could purchase sovereign bonds on the primary or secondary markets (or
a combination of both). Their activity on secondary markets would be facilitated by
European issuers’ tendency to top-up on-the-run bonds, which improves liquidity (in
combination with relatively active futures markets). Primary markets, however, are char-
acterized by substantial cross-country heterogeneity in terms of the timing and character-
istics of issues. Therefore, relying only on primary markets may complicate the process
of securitization, although some ingenuity by ESB-issuers and coordination among Debt
Management Offices (DMOs) can overcome this diversity. Only one form of heterogeneity
would be fatal to ESBies: that is, if a nation-state were to issue bonds that are senior to
the bonds underlying the ESBies. Such activity should be prohibited; if it were to take
place, the portfolio underlying ESBies would need to be changed accordingly.
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6.4.1 Heterogeneity in the timing of issues
Heterogeneity in the timing of issues creates warehousing risk for the ESB-issuer that
must hold sovereign bonds for a short period of time, subject to market and credit risk,
until it assembles the complete pool of underlying securities and places the corresponding
ESBies and EJBies. Warehousing risk is most severe during financial crises, when market
volatility is high and credit risk elevated. To some extent, warehousing risk is inevitable in
any securitization activity, and is compensated by the fees and spreads that accrue to the
issuer. In the case of ESBies, it is mitigated by the liquidity of the underlying sovereign
bonds, easing the process of buying them in secondary markets. Moreover, issuers could
sell “to-be-announced” securities—whereby an issuer sells forward contracts for delivery
of ESBies and EJBies on a pre-agreed date—using the proceeds to buy the underlying
national bonds. This reduces warehousing risk by placing the ESBies and EJBies at the
same time as the underlying sovereign bonds are being purchased.
Warehousing risk could be significantly reduced if purchases were to happen mostly
at primary issuance. This would be facilitated by coordination among debt management
offices (DMOs), as proposed by Giovannini (2000). DMOs would have strong incentives
to coordinate, since ESB-issuers would provide a large and steady demand for national
bonds. While this is not necessary for ESBies to be created, it would simplify matters.
6.4.2 Heterogeneity in bond maturities
Almost all nation-states in the euro area issue plentiful 1-year, 5-year and 10-year nominal
bonds. This may be a good place to start, and possibly even remain, in terms of ESBies’
maturities. Still, in any one month, or even quarter, several nation-states might not issue
any bonds in one of these maturity buckets. This problem could be overcome by the
ESB-issuer buying sovereign bonds also in secondary markets.
One obstacle would be if the quantity constraint were to bind: in a certain time
interval, some nation-states may not issue enough bonds of a given maturity, leading
to ESBies of different maturities but with the same origination date having potentially
different pool weights. There are two possible solutions to this problem. One would be
to re-open issues at later dates. National DMOs could re-open previous issues of 10-year
bonds (e.g., by re-opening it and adding more of a 9-year bond identical to it) to help
provide a supply of underlying assets. A second solution to this problem could be for
ESB-issuers to engage in time tranching, on top of the credit tranching that is at the
heart of ESBies. Time tranching, which is standard in the issuance of mortgage-backed
securities, consists of buying bonds of different maturities and then using their payouts
to service synthetic securities of different maturities.
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6.4.3 Heterogeneity in other bond characteristics
Euro area sovereign bonds differ in their coupons, indexing and other characteristics.
Again, greater coordination among DMOs on these bond characteristics would simplify
ESB-issuance. However, nation-states have different cash-flow requirements and prefer-
ences, so some degree of heterogeneity in bond characteristics is unavoidable. This need
not be a roadblock to the creation of ESBies, since issuers would have the technical capa-
bility to group sovereign bonds with slightly different characteristics. These institutions
have faced and overcome greater challenges with respect to the heterogeneity underlying
the securitizations of private securities.
6.5 Governance during restructuring
The ESB-issuer holds underlying bonds. Yet, having sold all tranches, the issuer would
have no incentive to act in accordance with the interests of ESB- and EJB-holders during
a restructuring procedure.
A standard solution to this problem is to require the issuer to retain a fraction of
the junior bond, so that it votes on restructuring proposals with interests aligned with
those of the EJB holders. However, this is not the only solution, nor is it necessary.
An alternative is to employ a special servicer that adheres to a servicing standard and
maximizes value on behalf of all investors. In private-sector securitizations, the special
servicer is typically controlled by the most junior investors in the deal, who can vote to
replace the special servicer.20 Once a tranche is wiped out, control shifts to the next most
junior class. The problem with this model is that it would concentrate considerable power
in a small number of agents, who would likely be subject to lobbying by special interests.
A third alternative is available, by which one applies the “look-through principle” to
the voting rights of ESB- and EJB-holders in proportion to the underlying face value of
the securitization. By distributing votes to both ESB- and EJB-holders, one avoids any
bias in favor of either holding-out or restructuring.21 Another advantage of applying the
“look-through principle” to voting rights is that it would ensure that veto power is not
assigned to ESB-issuers: thus, the market could sustain only a few ESB-issuers, without
engendering an excessive concentration of power in those issuers.
20 In post-crisis securitizations in the US, the special servicer is complemented with an operating
advisor, appointed by the senior investors, to balance any bias that the special servicer might have in
favor of junior bondholders.
21 With an uneven distribution, such bias arises from the fact that junior and senior bondholders have
a conflict of interest in restructuring procedures. Junior bondholders favor holding-out to preserve their
control and any remaining upside in their claim—although in euro sovereign debt their capacity to do so
is constrained by the existence of collective action clauses, which are required by the European Stability
Mechanism Treaty (paragraph 3, article 12). By contrast, senior bondholders have a “pro-restructuring”
bias, because a partial absorption of losses by EJB-holders improves the safety of the senior tranche. This
conflict of interest can therefore be dealt with by an even distribution of voting rights.
33
7 Catalyzing the market for ESBies
As with any new market, and especially one that would involve a large-scale, highly-
standardized, issuance program, it might take a while for ESBies to emerge. Reform of
the regulatory treatment of banks’ sovereign exposures (Subsection 6.1), the enforcement
of an ESBies’ Handbook (Subsection 6.2), the certification of ESB-issuers (Subsection 6.3),
and coordination of sovereign bond issuance (Subsection 6.4) all provide for a large steady-
state demand and supply in this market. However, policy intervention is necessary to
kickstart the market for ESBies. We envision this process taking place in three stages.
7.1 Stage one: limited experimentation
At first, ESB-issuance could be limited, with asset purchases taking place in secondary
markets. This would give a chance for mistakes in design to be corrected, and for details
of the contracts to be perfected. Issuance could increase gradually over time. On the buy
side, this gradual approach would allow investors—both banks and non-banks—to learn
about ESBies’ utility as a safe store of value. On the sell side, potential ESB-issuers would
have the opportunity to acquire information regarding the marginal cost of ESB-issuance,
and to charge fees accordingly. This process could take only a few months.
7.2 Stage two: a centralized swap mechanism
After the initial experimentation stage, policymakers could encourage large-scale ESB-
issuance within a relatively short time-frame. This would help to give the market a
critical mass—both microeconomically (in terms of liquidity) and macroeconomically (in
terms of safe asset creation).
In a reformed regulatory regime, banks would want to hold ESBies rather than na-
tional sovereign bonds. In transitioning to this steady state, however, banks may fear the
market risk of selling their sovereign bonds at potential fire-sale discounts, and buying
new securities at volatile prices. Policymakers and ESB-issuers could ease this transition
by arranging for a centralized swap mechanism, by which banks could swap a portfolio of
sovereign bonds for ESBies and EJBies. This swap could occur either at pre-set prices,
such as an average of historical prices, or through an auction mechanism whereby bank
and non-banks participants would submit a price schedule for euro area sovereign bonds
as well as ESBies and EJBies. This auction mechanism could be designed to elicit truthful
revelation of value. After the auction, ESB-issuers would hold the sovereign bonds that
underlie the synthetic security; banks would end up with ESBies and maybe some EJBies;
and non-bank investors would acquire primarily EJBies. While this auction may seem in-
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volved, it is much simpler than the famous spectrum auctions (used in selling frequencies
to telecommunications companies).
7.3 Stage three: transition to the new regulatory regime
Once the market for ESBies attains a critical mass, the new banking regulations could
be introduced gradually, allowing banks to comply within a transition period. In this
transition, lower-than-adequate risk weights for national sovereign debt and EJBies would
persist for a short while. Nevertheless, markets may put pressure on banks to engage in
front-running, as happened with capital requirements. Banks may try to move quickly to
meet the future regulatory requirements and use the swap auction to immediately satisfy
the new steady-state regulation. Such front-running is acceptable as long as there is a
well-functioning, liquid market for ESBies to facilitate banks’ portfolio rebalancing. This
underscores the importance of establishing the market for ESBies before changing the
prudential treatment of national sovereign bonds.
7.4 The role of the European Central Bank
The ECB is a big player in sovereign debt markets. The central bank would benefit from
the presence of ESBies, which provide for a union-wide safe asset with which to perform
monetary policy operations, thereby simplifying risk management decisions. The ECB
could catalyze the market for ESBies in two ways.
First, the ECB could announce that it would accept ESBies as collateral in monetary
policy operations, as suggested by Brunnermeier et al. (2011) and Garicano & Reichlin
(2014). As a general rule, banks should have no reason to hold sovereign bonds instead
of ESBies; changing the ECB’s collateral rules to reflect ESBies’ relative safety would be
consistent with this principle. The haircut rate at which the ECB would accept ESBies
as collateral in monetary policy operations should reflect ESBies’ superior safety relative
to national sovereign bonds. These new haircuts for ESBies would send a powerful signal
to markets regarding their treatment in the new regime.
Second, the ECB could use ESBies as its preferred security for open market operations
or quantitative easing. If the ECB wanted to expand its balance sheet, it could purchase
ESBies to pursue its mandate without bearing default risk. In the short run, with the
national sovereign bonds that it already owns and following the rules in the ESBies’
Handbook, the ECB could itself issue and place ESBies and EJBies in the market.
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8 Conclusion
Safe assets allow banks and other financial institutions to store value without being ex-
posed to default risk. In a cross-border currency area, the union-wide provision of safe
assets precludes distortionary flight-to-safety flows of capital across country borders. De-
spite their importance for the smooth functioning of financial markets, euro-denominated
safe assets are inadequately and asymmetrically supplied.
Following Brunnermeier et al. (2011), we advocate a solution: European Safe Bonds.
ESBies are the senior tranche of a diversified portfolio of euro area sovereign bonds. They
eliminate cross-border flight-to-safety capital flows because they pool the sovereign bonds
of all euro area member-states. They weaken the diabolic loop by providing banks with
a safe and liquid store of value. And they promise to approximately double the supply of
AAA-rated euro-denominated financial instruments.
Crucially, ESBies are designed with political reality in mind. They entail no joint
liability among sovereigns and require no significant change in treaties or legislation.
The inclusion of all nation-states in the securitization means that ESB-issuers would
provide a large and steady demand for national sovereign bonds. This is an attractive
proposition for heavily indebted nation-states, as it ensures a smooth transition towards
greater diversification in banks’ sovereign bond portfolios.
In this paper, we make three main contributions. First, we assess ESBies’ safety
via numerical simulations, and show that the interaction between pooling and tranching
achieves better outcomes than either of these two separately. We discuss the trade-off
between ESBies’ safety and the size of their supply to conclude that, with a subordination
level of 30%, ESBies would be safe even under adverse conditions and would more than
double the supply of euro safe assets. At the same time, the junior tranche would have risk
characteristics and embedded leverage that would be attractive to high-yield investors.
Second, we show theoretically that the simulations understate the benefits that ESBies
engender in equilibrium. In a model of banks and financial markets, we show analytically
that the sovereign-bank diabolic loop can be avoided thanks to banks’ safer bond portfo-
lios, thereby lowering the chance of a crisis.
Third, we outline the operational steps necessary to implement ESBies. Policymakers
should set common standards for ESBies and kickstart their issuance through initial
experimentation followed by a centralized swap mechanism, strong signals from the ECB,
and ultimately changes to banking regulation. The fact that ESBies have not yet been
created by financial markets speaks to the importance of these steps in overcoming the
regulatory and market failures that currently inhibit their creation.
With these three contributions, we hope to advance the policy debate on the merits
of ESBies, and eventually to make them a reality in euro area financial markets.
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Table 1: Simulation inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rating Debt/GDP Weight pd1 pd2 pd3 lgd1
Germany 1 71 28.16 5 0.5 0 40
Netherlands 1 65 6.61 10 1 0 40
Luxembourg 1 21 0.18 10 1 0 40
Austria 1.5 86 3.21 15 2 0 45
Finland 1.5 63 2.02 15 2 0 45
France 3 96 21.25 25 3 0.05 60
Belgium 3.5 106 3.93 30 4 0.1 62.5
Estonia 4.5 10 0.03 35 5 0.1 67.5
Slovakia 5 53 0.66 35 6 0.1 70
Ireland 6.5 94 1.80 40 6 0.12 75
Latvia 7 36 0.17 50 10 0.3 75
Lithuania 7 43 0.25 50 10 0.3 75
Malta 7.5 64 0.07 55 11 0.4 78
Slovenia 9 83 0.37 60 15 0.4 80
Spain 9 99 10.77 60 15 0.4 80
Italy 9.5 133 16.52 65 18 0.5 80
Portugal 12 129 1.77 70 30 2.5 85
Cyprus 13.5 109 0.19 75 40 10 87.5
Greece 19 177 2.01 95 75 45 95
Average 4.58 91 31.30 8.07 1.12 59.47
Note: This table reports the inputs used in the numerical simulations described in Section 4. In the table,
nation-states are ordered in terms of their sovereign credit ratings as of December 2015. Letter grades
are converted into a numerical score (1 is AAA, 19 is CCC-) and averaged across S&P and Moody’s;
this average credit rating is listed in column 1. Column 2 refers to consolidated general government
gross debt (following the Maastricht criteria) in 2015 as a percentage of GDP. Column 3 refers to the
percentage weight of each sovereign in the pooled euro area portfolio, corresponding to nation-states’
relative GDPs (with the constraint that the pooled portfolio cannot include more than 100% of nation-
states’ outstanding debt). Columns 4-6 describe the five-year default probabilities (in %) in states 1, 2
and 3 respectively. Column 7 describes the five-year loss-given-default rates (in %) in state 1; in state 2,
loss-given-default rates are 80% of those in state 1, and in state 3 they are 50% of those in state 1.
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Table 2: Correlations between nation-states’ default probabilities
Panel A: Benchmark scenario
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Panel B: Adverse scenario
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Note: Matrices show the correlations between nation-states’ probabilities of default in the benchmark
(Panel A, described in Subsection 4.2) and adverse (Panel B, described in Subsection 4.3) scenarios.
Correlations are much higher in the adverse scenario owing to the additional contagion assumptions.
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Table 3: Senior tranches’ five-year expected loss rates in the benchmark scenario (%)
Subordination 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Germany 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Netherlands 0.27 0.22 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Luxembourg 0.27 0.22 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Austria 0.50 0.42 0.32 0.19 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Finland 0.50 0.42 0.32 0.19 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
France 1.09 0.99 0.86 0.70 0.49 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Belgium 1.42 1.29 1.14 0.94 0.69 0.34 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Estonia 1.83 1.70 1.53 1.32 1.05 0.67 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00
Slovakia 2.05 1.91 1.74 1.52 1.23 0.83 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ireland 2.38 2.25 2.09 1.88 1.61 1.24 0.68 0.30 0.00 0.00
Latvia 3.42 3.22 2.97 2.65 2.24 1.68 0.85 0.38 0.00 0.00
Lithuania 3.41 3.21 2.96 2.64 2.23 1.68 0.85 0.38 0.00 0.00
Malta 3.92 3.72 3.46 3.13 2.70 2.14 1.30 0.67 0.00 0.00
Slovenia 4.90 4.65 4.35 3.96 3.45 2.78 1.77 0.91 0.00 0.00
Spain 4.90 4.66 4.35 3.97 3.45 2.78 1.77 0.91 0.00 0.00
Italy 5.63 5.34 4.99 4.53 3.93 3.14 1.97 0.98 0.00 0.00
Portugal 8.97 8.52 7.95 7.23 6.26 5.16 3.62 1.59 0.80 0.00
Cyprus 13.58 12.75 11.70 10.35 8.56 6.90 5.06 1.99 1.28 0.00
Greece 34.16 31.80 28.85 25.06 20.01 14.47 11.92 7.67 3.24 2.16
Pooled 2.79
ESBies 0.91 0.33 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Table shows the senior tranches’ five-year expected loss rates (in %) in the benchmark scenario
described in Subsection 4.2. It corresponds to the summary data presented in Figure 4 and Figure 5.
The first row of the table refers to the subordination level, which defines the size of the junior tranche.
0% subordination refers to the special case of no tranching. The remaining rows refer to the bonds of
nation-states and, in the penultimate row, the GDP-weighted securitization of the 19 euro area sovereign
bonds (without tranching), and in the final row ESBies (i.e. the senior tranche of the pooled security).
Numbers in black denote five-year expected loss rates below 0.5%, which is the threshold below which
we deem bonds to be safe, while numbers in gray denote loss rates above this safety threshold.
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Table 4: Junior tranches’ five-year expected loss rates in the benchmark scenario (%)
Subordination 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Germany 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.15
Netherlands 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.67 0.54 0.45 0.38 0.34 0.30
Luxembourg 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.67 0.54 0.45 0.38 0.33 0.30
Austria 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.17 1.00 0.84 0.72 0.63 0.56
Finland 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.17 1.00 0.84 0.72 0.63 0.56
France 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.98 1.94 1.81 1.55 1.36 1.21
Belgium 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.50 2.49 2.30 2.02 1.77 1.57
Estonia 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.01 3.00 2.85 2.62 2.29 2.03
Slovakia 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.27 3.16 2.93 2.57 2.28
Ireland 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.51 3.50 3.26 2.97 2.64
Latvia 5.21 5.21 5.21 5.19 5.16 5.13 4.72 4.28 3.80
Lithuania 5.19 5.19 5.19 5.17 5.14 5.11 4.70 4.26 3.79
Malta 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.75 5.70 5.66 5.31 4.90 4.36
Slovenia 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.02 6.98 6.60 6.12 5.44
Spain 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.02 6.98 6.61 6.12 5.44
Italy 8.18 8.18 8.18 8.18 8.12 8.07 7.62 7.04 6.25
Portugal 13.03 13.03 13.03 13.03 12.78 12.53 12.13 11.01 9.96
Cyprus 21.11 21.11 21.11 21.11 20.26 19.26 18.55 16.66 15.09
Greece 55.39 55.39 55.39 55.39 53.85 48.99 45.51 41.89 37.72
EJBies 19.70 12.63 9.10 6.96 5.58 4.65 3.99 3.49 3.10
Note: Table shows the junior tranches’ five-year expected loss rates (in %) in the benchmark scenario
described in Subsection 4.2. It corresponds to the summary data presented in Figure 7. The first row of
the table refers to the subordination level, which defines the size of the junior tranche. The remaining
rows refer to the bonds of nation-states and, in the final row, EJBies (i.e. the junior tranche of the
pooled security). Numbers in black denote five-year expected loss rates below 7%, which represents the
approximate threshold below which bonds would be rated investment grade, while numbers in gray denote
loss rates above this threshold.
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Table 5: Conditional default probabilities (%)
Benchmark scenario Adverse scenario
conditional on a default by: conditional on a default by:
Germany France Spain Italy Germany France Spain Italy
Germany 100 3 2 2 100 18 12 11
Netherlands 7 6 4 4 26 19 14 14
Luxembourg 7 6 4 4 25 20 14 14
Austria 10 9 7 7 28 22 16 16
Finland 10 9 7 7 28 22 16 16
France 17 100 11 11 46 100 28 27
Belgium 20 19 14 13 44 45 31 30
Estonia 24 22 16 16 46 47 32 32
Slovakia 24 23 17 16 70 69 62 61
Ireland 28 25 19 18 70 70 63 62
Latvia 35 33 25 24 72 72 65 64
Lithuania 35 33 25 24 72 72 65 64
Malta 39 36 28 27 73 73 66 65
Slovenia 44 41 32 31 75 74 68 67
Spain 43 40 100 31 81 77 100 67
Italy 47 44 35 100 84 79 72 100
Portugal 56 52 44 43 80 79 74 73
Cyprus 62 59 52 51 82 82 77 77
Greece 88 86 82 81 93 93 91 91
Note: Table shows the default probabilities of euro area nation-states (given in the rows of the table)
conditional on the default of Germany, France, Spain or Italy (given in the columns). These conditional
default probabilities are shown for the benchmark scenario (Subsection 4.2) and the adverse scenario
(Subsection 4.3). In the benchmark scenario, correlations between nation-states’ default probabilities
arise entirely out of the state of the euro area economy and similarity in credit ratings. Default probabil-
ities are otherwise independent. Conditional default probabilities are shown for the benchmark scenario
for comparison with those of the adverse scenario, in which there are four additional contagion assump-
tions governing the correlation matrix of default probabilities. Owing to these additional contagion
assumptions, default probabilities conditional on the default of Germany, France, Spain or Italy increase
monotonically in the adverse scenario relative to the benchmark scenario. If Italy defaults, for example,
Spain then has a probability of default of 67% in the adverse scenario, up from 31% in the benchmark
scenario. This underscores the severity of the adverse scenario.
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Table 6: Five-year expected loss rates in the adverse scenario (%)
Subordination 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Tranche S J S J S J S J S J
Germany 0.50 0.40 1.43 0.27 1.43 0.11 1.42 0.00 1.26 0.00 1.01
Netherlands 0.69 0.55 1.94 0.38 1.94 0.16 1.93 0.00 1.73 0.00 1.38
Luxembourg 0.69 0.55 1.94 0.38 1.94 0.16 1.93 0.00 1.73 0.00 1.38
Austria 0.96 0.80 2.41 0.60 2.41 0.35 2.40 0.09 2.27 0.00 1.93
Finland 0.96 0.80 2.41 0.60 2.41 0.35 2.40 0.09 2.27 0.00 1.93
France 1.94 1.75 3.66 1.51 3.66 1.20 3.66 0.81 3.63 0.33 3.54
Belgium 2.64 2.40 4.80 2.10 4.80 1.71 4.80 1.22 4.76 0.54 4.74
Estonia 3.10 2.87 5.23 2.57 5.23 2.19 5.23 1.70 5.20 1.03 5.18
Slovakia 5.58 5.16 9.30 4.65 9.30 3.98 9.30 3.13 9.25 1.97 9.19
Ireland 6.05 5.68 9.40 5.21 9.40 4.62 9.40 3.83 9.37 2.80 9.30
Latvia 6.81 6.38 10.66 5.85 10.66 5.16 10.66 4.26 10.62 3.09 10.53
Lithuania 6.80 6.37 10.64 5.84 10.64 5.15 10.64 4.26 10.61 3.08 10.52
Malta 7.32 6.91 11.04 6.39 11.04 5.73 11.04 4.85 11.03 3.72 10.92
Slovenia 8.17 7.74 12.05 7.20 12.05 6.51 12.05 5.59 12.05 4.41 11.94
Spain 6.80 6.45 9.94 6.02 9.94 5.46 9.94 4.71 9.94 3.75 9.86
Italy 7.22 6.85 10.58 6.38 10.58 5.78 10.58 4.98 10.58 3.96 10.49
Portugal 11.80 11.21 17.12 10.47 17.12 9.52 17.12 8.25 17.12 6.78 16.82
Cyprus 16.07 15.12 24.61 13.93 24.61 12.41 24.61 10.37 24.61 8.41 23.73
Greece 35.19 32.79 56.77 29.79 56.77 25.94 56.77 20.80 56.77 15.15 55.23
Pooled 3.84
ESBies / EJBies 2.02 20.24 1.02 15.13 0.42 11.81 0.15 9.38 0.03 7.64
Note: Table shows the five-year expected loss rates (in %) in the adverse scenario described in Subsec-
tion 4.3. The first row refers to the subordination level, which defines the size of the junior tranche. The
second row refers to the tranche type; “S” (in black) denotes the senior tranche and “J” (in gray) the
junior tranche. The cell referring to 0% subordination is blank, since there is no tranching in this case:
all bonds are pari passu. The remaining rows refer to the bonds of nation-states and, in the final row,
the pooled security, which represents a GDP-weighted securitization of the 19 euro area nation-states’
sovereign bonds.
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Mathematical Appendix
A No Pooling or Tranching
We start with the special case in which banks hold only domestic bonds (β = 0). This case illustrates
our model’s basic mechanics without the complexities of pooling and tranching. When banks hold only
domestic bonds, the relevant sunspot is the one observed domestically.
We make three parametric assumptions, which we carry over to the cases of pooling and tranching.
First, the government’s primary surplus before bail-out costs remains positive:
S − τψL0 ≥ 0. (1)
Second, banks’ aggregate equity is sufficiently small that the diabolic loop occurs at least if exposure is
maximal, such that domestic banks hold all outstanding domestic sovereign bonds (i.e. α = 1):
E0 < piτψL0. (2)
Third, if the surplus is high, the government can still fully repay its debt even after a bail-out at t = 2
for any α (even for α = 1):22
S − S ≥ τψL0 − E0. (3)
If the sunspot is observed at t = 1 and a bail-out occurs at t = 2, the government surplus at t = 3 is
S − τψL0 +α (B1 − S) +E0 =: S − C, where C is the implied (endogenous) bail-out cost. Assumption
3 ensures that when S = S the debt is fully repaid. When S = S, only S −C is repaid. Hence, the price
of domestic bonds at t = 1 if the sunspot is observed at t = 1 and a bail-out is expected to occur at t = 2
is B1 = S − piC, so piC ≡ ∆1 is the price discount relative to the face value S. Recalling the definition
of the bail-out cost C and using B1 = S −∆1, we find that the discount ∆1 is
∆1 = pi [τψL0 − α(B1 − S)− E0] (4)
= pi(τψL0 − E0)1− αpi .
Hence, banks are left with negative equity if
α(B1 − S) + E0 < 0 (5)
⇔ E0 < αpiτψL0.
When banks are left with negative equity, the government bails them out if the capital shortfall is smaller
than the cost τψL0 of not bailing them out, i.e.,
α(B1 − S) + E0 + τψL0 > 0 (6)
⇔ E0 > (2αpi − 1) τψL0.
If banks’ equity is below the threshold in (5), and the bail-out condition (6) holds, then the domestic
sunspot leads to the domestic diabolic loop equilibrium. Equation (5) can hold for some parameter values
because of (2). Moreover, (5) and (6) can hold simultaneously for a subset of these values because αpi < 1.
22 This assumption is only used to simplify calculations, but can be relaxed without changing the
conclusions.
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Conversely, if banks’ equity is above the threshold in (5), then the domestic sunspot does not lead to the
domestic diabolic loop equilibrium.
B Pooling
When a sunspot is observed in one country it may be the case that only that country must recapitalize
its banks. We denote by ∆11 the value of ∆1 for the recapitalizing country: this is the difference between
the face value S of that country’s bond and the bond’s price B1 in period 1. Alternatively, it may
be the case that both countries must recapitalize their banks. We denote by ∆12 the value of ∆1 when
recapitalization must take place in both countries (regardless of whether this is the outcome of the sunspot
being observed in one or both countries): this is the difference between the face value S of the bond of
either country and the bond price B1. To compute banks’ equity at t = 1, we note that their portfolio of
αS face value of the domestic bond and βS face value of the pooled security is equivalent to
(
α+ β2
)
S
face value of the domestic bond and β2S face value of the foreign bond.
When only one country recapitalizes its banks, the cost for that country is
C1 = τψL0 −
(
α+ β2
)
(B1 − S)− E0 (7)
= τψL0 +
(
α+ β2
)
∆11 − E0.
Combining (7) with ∆11 = piC1, we find
C1 = τψL0 +
(
α+ β2
)
piC1 − E0 (8)
= τψL0 − E0
1−
(
α+ β2
)
pi
.
Hence, banks in the recapitalizing country are left with negative equity if
−
(
α+ β2
)
∆11 + E0 < 0 (9)
⇔ E0 <
(
α+ β2
)
piτψL0.
On the other hand, banks in the non-recapitalizing country are left with non-negative equity if
− β2 ∆11 + E0 ≥ 0 (10)
⇔ E0 ≥
β
2
1− αpipiτψL0.
When both countries recapitalize their banks, the cost per country is
C2 = τψL0 −
(
α+ β2
)
(B1 − S)− β2 (B1 − S)− E0 (11)
= τψL0 + (α+ β) ∆12 − E0.
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Combining (11) with ∆12 = piC2, we find
C2 = τψL0 + (α+ β)piC2 − E0 (12)
= τψL0 − E01− (α+ β)pi .
Hence, banks in either country are left with negative equity if
− α∆12 + E0 < 0 (13)
⇔ E0 < (α+ β)piτψL0.
Based on the above analysis, we can divide the parameter space into four regions:
• E0 ≥ (α + β)piτψL0. Equity is large enough that the sunspot, whether observed in one or both
countries, does not lead to the diabolic loop equilibrium.
• (α+ β)piτψL0 > E0 ≥
(
α+ β2
)
piτψL0. When the sunspot is observed in both countries, it leads
to the diabolic loop equilibrium. When it is observed in one country only, and the bond prices
in the other country do not move, then the diabolic loop equilibrium does not arise even in the
country observing the sunspot. This is the diversification region.
•
(
α+ β2
)
piτψL0 > E0 ≥
β
2
1−αpipiτψL0. When the sunspot is observed in both countries, it leads
to the diabolic loop equilibrium. When it is observed in one country only, it leads to the diabolic
loop equilibrium only in that country.
•
β
2
1−αpipiτψL0 > E0. When the sunspot is observed in both countries, it leads to the diabolic loop
equilibrium. When it is observed in one country only, it leads to the diabolic loop equilibrium in
both countries. This is the contagion region.
We can fix γ := α+ β, and plot the four regions in the (E0, β) space. This is done in Figure 9.
C Pooling and Tranching
As in the case of pooling and no tranching, we distinguish cases depending on whether one or both
countries recapitalize their banks. The analysis is more complicated than in the case of pooling and no
tranching because we must also distinguish cases depending on whether or not the senior tranche incurs
losses. We denote by BE1 the period 1 price of an ESBies security produced by tranching face value S
of the pooled security. We also denote by ∆E11 the difference between the face value fS of that ESBies
security and the price BE1 when only one country recapitalizes, and by ∆E12 the same difference when both
countries recapitalize.
C.1 Only one country recapitalizes
When only one country recapitalizes its banks, the cost for that country is
C1 = τψL0 − α(B1 − S)− β
f
(BE1 − fS)− E0 (14)
= τψL0 + α∆11 +
β
f
∆E11 − E0.
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To compute the equilibrium, we must distinguish two cases.
Case a: The senior tranche incurs no losses. Combining (14) with ∆11 = piC1 and ∆E11 = 0, we
find
C1 = τψL0 + αpiC1 − E0 (15)
= τψL0 − E01− αpi .
Banks in the recapitalizing country are left with negative equity if
− α∆11 + E0 < 0 (16)
⇔ E0 < αpiτψL0.
The senior tranche incurs no losses if
S − C12 ≥ Sf (17)
⇔ S(1− f) ≥ τψL0 − E02(1− αpi) .
Case b: The senior tranche incurs losses in the state in which the recapitalizing country
has primary surplus S.23 Combining (14) with ∆11 = piC2 and ∆E11 = pi
[
C2
2 − S(1− f)
]
, we find
C2 = τψL0 + αpiC2 +
β
f
pi
[
C2
2 − S(1− f)
]
− E0 (18)
=
τψL0 − E0 − βf piS(1− f)
1−
(
α+ β2f
)
pi
.
Banks in the recapitalizing country are left with negative equity if
− α∆11 − β
f
∆E11 + E0 < 0 (19)
⇔ −αpiC2 − β
f
pi
[
C2
2 − S(1− f)
]
+ E0 < 0
⇔ E0 <
(
α+ β2f
)
piτψL0 − β
f
piS(1− f).
Banks in the non-recapitalizing country are left with non-negative equity if
− β
f
∆E11 + E0 ≥ 0 (20)
⇔ E0 ≥
β
2f
1− αpipiτψL0 −
β
f
piS(1− f).24
23 Note that we do not need to distinguish cases according to the primary surplus of the non-
recapitalizing country because that country always repays S on its bonds.
24 Note that we do not need to check this condition in Case a because banks in the non-recapitalizing
country can be affected only through their exposure in the senior tranche, and the senior tranche incurs
no losses.
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The senior tranche incurs losses in the state in which the recapitalizing country has primary surplus S if
S − C22 < Sf (21)
⇔ S(1− f) < τψL0 − E02(1− αpi) .
C.2 Both countries recapitalize
When both countries recapitalize their banks, the cost per country is
C2 = τψL0 − α(B1 − S)− β
f
(BE1 − fS)− E0 (22)
= τψL0 + α∆12 +
β
f
∆E12 − E0.
To compute the equilibrium, we must distinguish three cases.
Case a: The senior tranche incurs no losses. Combining (22) with ∆12 = piC2 and ∆E12 = 0, we
find
C2 = τψL0 + αpiC2 − E0 (23)
= τψL0 − E01− αpi .
Banks in either country are left with negative equity if
− α∆12 + E0 < 0 (24)
⇔ E0 < αpiτψL0.
The senior tranche incurs no losses if
S − C2 ≥ Sf (25)
⇔ S(1− f) ≥ τψL0 − E01− αpi .
Case b: The senior tranche incurs losses only in the state in which both countries have
primary surplus S. Combining (22) with ∆12 = piC2 and ∆E12 = pi2 [C2 − S(1− f)], we find
C2 = τψL0 + αpiC2 +
β
f
pi2 [C2 − S(1− f)]− E0 (26)
=
τψL0 − E0 − βf pi2S(1− f)
1− αpi − βf pi2
.
Banks in either country are left with negative equity if
− α∆12 − β
f
pi2∆E12 + E0 < 0 (27)
⇔ −αpiC2 − β
f
pi2 [C2 − S(1− f)] + E0 < 0
⇔ E0 < (αpi + β
f
pi2)τψL0 − β
f
pi2S(1− f).
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The senior tranche incurs losses in the state in which both countries have primary surplus S if
S − C2 < Sf (28)
⇔ S(1− f) < τψL0 − E01− αpi .
It incurs no losses in the state in which only one country has primary surplus S if
S − C22 ≥ Sf (29)
⇔ S(1− f) ≥ τψL0 − E0
2− 2αpi − βf pi2
.
Case c: The senior tranche incurs losses also in the states where only one country has
primary surplus S. Combining (22) with ∆12 = piC2 and
∆E12 = pi2 [C2 − S(1− f)] + 2pi(1− pi)
[
C2
2 − S(1− f)
]
,
we find
C2 = τψL0 + αpiC2 +
β
f
[piC2 − pi(2− pi)S(1− f)]− E0 (30)
=
τψL0 − E0 − βf pi(2− pi)S(1− f)
1− (α+ βf )pi
.
Banks in either country are left with negative equity if
− α∆12 − β
f
∆E12 + E0 < 0 (31)
⇔ E0 < (α+ β
f
)piτψL0 − β
f
pi(2− pi)S(1− f).
The senior tranche incurs losses in the state in which only one country has primary surplus S if
S − C22 < Sf (32)
⇔ S(1− f) < τψL0 − E0
2− 2αpi − βf pi2
.
C.3 Parameter regions
Based on the above analysis, we can divide the parameter space into regions, in a way analogous to that
in Subsection B. We distinguish cases according to the value of S(1− f).
Case 1 (low subordination): τψL02 > S(1− f). There are four regions, as follows:
• No diabolic loop: E0 ≥ (α+ βf )piτψL0 − βf pi(2− pi)S(1− f).
• Diversification region: (α+ βf )piτψL0− βf pi(2−pi)S(1− f) > E0 ≥
(
α+ β2f
)
piτψL0− βf piS(1− f).
• Uncorrelated diabolic loop:
(
α+ β2f
)
piτψL0− βf piS(1− f) > E0 ≥ β2f(1−αpi)piτψL0− βf piS(1− f).
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• Contagion region: β2f(1−αpi)piτψL0 − βf piS(1− f) > E0.
The argument goes as follows. Suppose that τψL02 > S(1 − f). Then, when only one country
recapitalizes, Case a is not possible because (16) and (17) imply that
S(1− f) ≥ τψL0 − αpiτψL02(1− αpi) =
τψL0
2 ,
which is a contradiction. A similar argument implies that when both countries recapitalize, Cases a and
b are not possible. Therefore, the boundaries of the regions when only one country recapitalizes and
when both countries recapitalize are defined by Cases b and c, respectively.
Case 2 (high subordination): τψL0 > S(1− f) > τψL02 . There are four regions, as follows:
• No diabolic loop: E0 ≥ (αpi + βf pi2)τψL0 − βf pi2S(1− f).
• Diversification region: (αpi + βf pi2)τψL0 − βf pi2S(1− f) > E0 ≥ αpiτψL0.
• Uncorrelated diabolic loop: αpiτψL0 > E0 ≥ max{ β2f(1−αpi)piτψL0 − βf piS(1− f), 0}.
• Contagion region: max{ β2f(1−αpi)piτψL0 − βf piS(1− f), 0} > E0.
The argument goes as follows. Suppose that S(1 − f) > τψL02 . Then, when only one country
recapitalizes, the maximum value of E0 must belong to Case a. Indeed, if it belongs to Case b, then (19)
implies that it must be equal to
E0 =
(
α+ β2f
)
piτψL0 − β
f
piS(1− f).
Under that value, (21) holds if and only if
S(1− f) <
τψL0 −
(
α+ β2f
)
piτψL0 + βf piS(1− f)
2(1− αpi)
which is equivalent to τψL02 > S(1− f) and hence implies a contradiction. Hence, the maximum value of
E0 is as in Case a, i.e., E0 = αpiτψL0. A similar argument implies that when both countries recapitalize,
the maximum value of E0 must belong to Case b. The latter argument uses both inequalities, i.e.,
τψL0 > S(1− f) > τψL02 .
Case 3 (very high subordination): S(1− f) > τψL0. There are three regions, as follows:
• No diabolic loop: E0 ≥ ατψL0.
• Uncorrelated diabolic loop region: αpiτψL0 > E0 ≥ max{ β2f(1−αpi)piτψL0 − βf piS(1− f), 0}.
• Contagion region: max{ β2f(1−αpi)piτψL0 − βf piS(1− f), 0} > E0.
The argument is similar to the preceding ones. Suppose that S(1 − f) > τψL0. Then, when only
one country recapitalizes, the maximum value of E0 must belong to Case a. And when both countries
recapitalize, the maximum value of E0 must also belong to Case a.
We can fix γ := α + β, and plot the regions in the (E0, β)) space. Panels B and C in Figure 9
correspond to Cases 1 and 2 respectively. Case 3 represents the limiting case in which the diversification
region and (for very high S(1−f)) the contagion region disappear. The boundary between the no diabolic
loop and the diversification regions, and the boundary between the diversification and the single diabolic
loop regions, are straight lines. Assumption 1 ensures that these lines have negative slope.
51
